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A continuing theme of the Conference on Marriage, Democracy,
and Families has been the role of the state in structuring and regulating
family relationships. But like so many areas, in the era of globalization,
members of a family unit-or the family itself-may move across
national borders. Thus, nationals of different countries may set up the
family unit in a particular country, or the family itself may move across
national borders. Family units may break up, and regulation of the
dissolved family unit may be of concern to more than one state. Thus, on
a variety of issues, in the transnational context, the different values that
define family structure within particular cultures will come into direct
conflict. Private international law (conflict of laws) has much to
contribute to the accommodation of these competing interests.
Like so many issues of globalization, regulation of family issues in
the transnational context can be addressed through principles of
territorial accommodation and/or agreement on universal norms.
However, consensus about universal norms may be difficult to achieve
given strong governmental interests in the structure of the family and the
relationship of family members by respective states. Two topics-crossborder custody disputes and same-sex unions-serve as examples of the
more general problem. Each offers an approach incorporating principles
of private international law to resolve the tensions.
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CROSS-BORDER CUSTODY DISPUTES

Disputes over and about children are some of the hardest issues in
the transnational context. First, these issues are so personal and strike
such emotional chords that the stakes become quite high. Questions
about custody go to the very core of people's lives, and parties are often
willing to go to extraordinary lengths to obtain what they want and need.
Second, the traditional judicial process-whether in a common law or
civil law regime-is a very poor mechanism for settling the kinds of
issues that arise in these disputes. The questions that authorities are
asked to resolve in these cases, e.g., what particular custodial
arrangements would be in the best interests of a particular child, should a
parent be permitted to relocate with a child, when and how should a
parent be permitted to exercise rights of access, do not turn on the kinds
of fact/law determinations that characterize other types of litigation. Nor
is a judicial proceeding, with its formal rules, likely to produce an
accurate snapshot of the real family dynamic. Resolution of these
matters is part of a value-laden decision-making process that necessarily
brings into play differences in culture, attitudes, and moral standards.
The classic family law casebook example of this is Painterv. Bannister,
where the Iowa Supreme Court found the Bohemian lifestyle of the
natural father sufficiently bizarre that it granted custody to the Iowa
maternal grandparents after the death of the mother over the strenuous
objection of the father.' The role of culture and values-and
stereotypes-is magnified even more dramatically in the transborder
context. Consider, for example, the Bahamian court order that gave
custody to a Saudi father rather than an American mother, explaining
that the decision was taken in order to avoid the risk of the children
becoming "little Americans," of "losing the cultural heritage of Saudi
Arabia," and of "losing the inheritance of royalty." 2 How one overcomes
these kinds of cultural biases-whether in the United States or
elsewhere-is well beyond the scope of this Article or the parameters of
this Conference. Nonetheless, legal systems must be sensitive to
legitimate cultural norms and values, particularly in disputes involving
children. Private international law principles do play an important role
here, and two multilateral treaties reflect private international law norms

1. 140 N.W.2d 152, 155-56 (Iowa 1966) (finding that father would provide child with
"unstable, unconventional, arty, Bohemian, and probably intellectually stimulating" lifestyle).
2. Al-Fassi v. AI-Fassi, 433 So. 2d 664, 665-68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (citing prior Bahamian
custody decision).
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in this area.3 Similar principles in United States law make the same
assessment, although not entirely without criticism.
An example comes from a case that arose in the United States.4 The
mother and father in the case were both Pakistani, and the child was born
in Pakistan. When the daughter was eight years old, the mother, Joohi,
left the marital home and moved in with her parents in Pakistan. When
she realized that her husband, Anwar, had filed custody proceedings in
Pakistan, she fled to the United States with her daughter. Nonetheless,
the custody case proceeded in the Pakistani court. The mother was
represented by counsel but refused to appear in the proceeding; she also
refused to obey a court order that the child be produced in Pakistan. The
Pakistani judge considered a written statement submitted by the mother
detailing certain unsavory aspects of the husband's character, but
nonetheless awarded custody to the father. Using private detectives, the
father located the mother and child in Maryland some two years later.
The mother then brought suit in Maryland requesting custody while the
father sought enforcement of the Pakistani order that had granted him
custody. 5 Under United States law-in this case, state law-(and state
law today is either the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
("UCCJA") or the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement
Act ("UCCJEA"))6 -- it is clear that Pakistan would be the "home state"
of the child. Under the Uniform Act provisions-as well as general
principles of private international law-it is the home state or state of
habitual residence that is the appropriate court to hear a custody

3. See Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation
in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, Oct. 19, 1996, 35
I.L.M. 1391 (1996) [hereinafter Protection Convention]; Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction, opened for signature Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S.
89 (entered into force Dec. 1, 1983) [hereinafter Abduction Convention].
4. See Hosain v. Malik, 671 A.2d 988 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
5. See id.at 989-90.
6. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT, 9 pt. IA U.L.A. 649 (1999
& Supp. 2003) [hereinafter UCCJEA]; UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY AND JURISDICTION ACT, 9 pt. IA
U.L.A. 261 (1999 & Supp. 2003) [hereinafter UCCJA]. The UCCJEA is currently in force in
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia. See UCCJEA, supra, Table of Jurisdictions
Wherein Act Has Been Adopted (Supp. 2003). The UCCJA remains in effect in Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Vermont, Virgin Islands, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See UCCJA, supra, Table of Jurisdictions
Wherein Act Has Been Adopted (Supp. 2003).
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jurisdiction case; moreover, under those Acts, the decree of the state or
country of habitual residence is entitled to recognition and enforcement. 7
By way of resistance to enforcement, the mother attempted to show
that the Pakistani court did not apply the "best interests" of the child test
in awarding custody and, thus, that the order of the Pakistani court
should not be enforced on public policy grounds. 8 Under the new
UCCJEA, now in force in most U.S. states, enforcement of foreign
country custody orders is required unless the "child custody law of a
foreign country violates fundamental principles of human rights." 9 The
Maryland court held an evidentiary hearing on the substance of child
custody law and its application in Pakistan. The evidence showed that
Pakistan applied the Guardians and Wards Act of 1890, a statute
originally enacted when Pakistan was part of the British Empire and
since codified in Pakistani law, governing child custody matters, which
specifically requires Pakistani courts to consider the welfare of the
minor. 10 But, of course, it is also true that the application of such a
standard in Hosain was filtered through the lens of Pakistani culture and
values; this "personal law" of Hazanit, which is religious law based on
Hinduism and Islam, played an important role in the court's
determination of the child's welfare. 1" Among the principles of Hazanit
claimed to be objectionable were that the mother's right to her female
child up to the age of puberty was lost because she removed the child to
the United States where the father was unable to exercise his right to
7. See UCCJEA, supra note 6, § 105(c). Section 23 of the UCCJA extended the policies of the
Act to international cases, but not all states adopted that section. Section 105 of the UCCJEA makes
clear that the jurisdiction and enforcement principles 'ofthe Act have international application. See id.
§ 105(a) (providing that foreign States shall be treated "as if [they] were a State of the United States"); id.
§ 105(b) (providing that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a child-custody determination
made in a foreign country under factual circumstances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional
standards of this [Act] must be recognized and enforced under [Article] 3"); id. § 105(c) (providing an
exception to recognition and enforcement if "the child custody law of a foreign country violates
fundamental principles of human rights").
8. See Hosain, 671 A.2dat993.
9. UCCJEA, supra note 6, § 105(c). In the actual case, the Maryland court (under the earlier
UCCJA, which did not have an express provision for international cases).applied "comity," stating that it
would recognize the Pakistani decree unless the Pakistani court (1) did not apply the best interests of the
child standard when it awarded custody or (2) applied a law 'so contrary to Maryland public policy as to
undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial."' Hosain, 671 A.2d at 991 (quoting Malik v. Malik,
638 A.2d 1184, 1190 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994)).
10. See Hosain, 671 A.2d at 990-91; see also Pakistan Statutes VIII v.3 p.258.
11. See Hos'ain, 671 A.2d at 1003-05; see also SYED MUMTAZ ALl, CUSTODY AND
GUARDIANSHIP IN ISLAM, at http://muslim-canada.org/guardian.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2004)
(describing the principles pertaining to "Hizanah" or the "guardianship over the rearing and bringing up
of' children); Hosain, 671 A.2d at 1001 n.7 (noting that the parties referred to this concept as either
"Hazanit" or "Hizanat").
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control as the child's natural guardian. In addition, the mother was said
to have "lost" her rights because she was an apostate (wicked or
untrustworthy) and did not promote the religious or secular interests of
the child; the fact that the mother had an adulterous relationship and
failed to enroll her daughter in a religious school were factors
relied
2
upon by the Pakistani court in awarding custody to the father.'
Whether or not some of these factors might also have been relevant
in the "best interests" calculus in some courts of the United States, it is
undoubtedly true that the "best interests" test as applied and understood
in the Pakistani courts was substantially different than it would have
been in the hands of an American court. Nonetheless, as the Maryland
court explained: "a Pakistani court could only determine the best interest
of a Pakistani child by an analysis utilizing the customs, culture,
religion, and mores of the community and country of which the child
and-in this case-her parents were a part, i.e., Pakistan."'' 3 Thus, the
Maryland court refused to rehear the custody issues and enforced the
Pakistani judgment. The court believed that to do otherwise would be to
encourage circumvention of the laws of the home state through the
abduction of children to a place that would award custody on a basis
more in harmony with the fugitive's interests. 14
The court's decision in Hosain adopts a strict rule of deference and
enforces the decree of the court of a country that was both the child's
habitual residence and the country of citizenship of all the parties
involved. Although one is always moved to take account of the child's
interests and to protect the child at all costs, "best interests" is an
amorphous concept filtered through the customs and mores indigenous
to a particular society; cultural relativism cannot be completely ignored.
Those who would look to the United Nations' Convention on the Rights
of the Child 15 for guidance will not find any clear solution. There can be
little quarrel with the basic concept of the U.N. Convention-that all
actions concerning a child take account of his or her best interests. 16 But
particular principles of the U.N. Convention are often in tension with
others. For example, a child has a right to live with his or her parents,
but the Convention recognizes that when the parents live separately a

12.
13.

See Hosain, 671 A.2d at 991-92, 1002-05.
Id. at 1000.

14. Seeid. at998-90, 1010-11.
15. 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990).
16. See id., art. 3, at 46 ("In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.").
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decision must be made regarding where the child should live. The child
has the right to maintain contact with both parents, except if it is
contrary to the child's best interests.1 7 States are under an obligation to
prevent and remedy the kidnapping or retention of children abroad by a
parent or third party, i8 and strong principles of enforcement of other
countries' custody decrees serve that end.
Two international conventions negotiated at The Hague Conference
on Private International Law have attempted to establish as principles of
private international law a similar respect for the custody and access
decisions of courts in the country of habitual residence.1 9 The most
recent convention, the 1996 Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable
Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental
Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children 20 (sometimes
known as the Protection of Children Convention), would give authorities
in the state of habitual residence jurisdiction to make decisions about the
child-including custody-to the exclusion of other states and would
require recognition of those decisions by other countries, subject to a
situation where recognition would be "manifestly contrary to public
policy ... taking into account the best interests of the child.",2 1 The 1980
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, which has been in operation for over two decades, requires
countries to return children to the country of habitual residence in cases
where they have been wrongfully removed or retained. The ultimate
merits decision about who is entitled to custody is then to be made by
the country of habitual residence. 22 The Abduction Convention includes
a number of limited defenses to return, and a bit of cultural imperialism
has led to an unwarranted expansion of these defenses.23 For example, a
17. See id., art.
9, at47.
18. See id., art.11,at48.
19. See generally Linda Silberman, The Hague Children's Conventions: The Internationalization
of Child Law, in CROSS CURRENTS: FAMILY LAW AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND

589-617 (Sanford N. Katz et al. eds., 2000).
20. See Protection Convention, supra note 3. For a more in-depth analysis, see Linda
Silberman, The 1996 Hague Convention on the Protection of Children: Should the United States
Join?, 34 FAM. L.Q. 239 (2000); Linda Silberman, The 1996 Convention on Jurisdiction,Applicable
Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and
Measuresfor the Protectionof Children: A Perspectivefrom the United States, in PRIVATE LAW IN
THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA-LIBER AMICORUM KURT SIEHR 559 (J. Basedow et al. eds., 2000).

21.

See Protection Convention, supra note 3, art. 23(2)(d), 35 I.L.M. at 1399.

22.

Seeid. arts. 1,16, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670 at4, 8-9, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 101.

23. For a comparison of the application of the primary defenses to return in the United States
and Germany, see Karin Wolfe, Note, A Tale of Two States: Successes and Failures of the 1980
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of InternationalChild Abduction in the United States and

Germany, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 285, 324-39 (2000).
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child need not be returned if there is a "grave risk" that return of the
child "would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or
otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation." 24 It is difficult for
the court of a state that is hearing the return petition not to impose its
own values in that situation. Indeed, the Abduction Convention leaves
countries with some latitude in that respect, but not without regard to the
common objective of contracting states to deter international child
abduction. A court with a return petition before it must respect the
ability of the courts of other countries to protect children in ways
consistent with that country's own values and norms.25
The Abduction Convention touches on these cultural issues at
numerous points. For example, the Convention provides that a removal
or retention of a child is wrongful if "it is in breach of rights of custody
attributed to a person ... under the law of the state in which the child
was habitually resident., 26 Rights of custody are in turn defined by the
Convention to "include rights relating to the care of the person of the
child and, in particular, the right to determine the child's place of
residence. 2a Thus, the state of the habitual residence defines through its
own laws the respective custodial rights of the parents-within the
framework of an autonomous definition provided by the Convention.
Therefore, countries must respect the custodial rights as recognized in
the state of habitual residence.
28
A good example of such respect is shown in Whallon v. Lynn,
where the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit examined Mexican law
to determine custodial rights of unwed parents. In Whallon, the parties
were not married, and the mother asserted that the father did not have the
requisite rights of custody to invoke the Abduction Convention. 29 The
First Circuit emphasized that the relevant provisions of Mexican law
were to be interpreted "in light of the Convention's basic principle that a
child's country of habitual residence is best placed to decide upon
24.

Abduction Convention, supra note 3, art. 13(b), T.I.A.S. No. 11,670 at 9, 1343 U.N.T.S.

at 100.
25. See Linda Silberman, Patching Up the Abduction Convention: A Callfor a New International
Protocol and a Suggestion for Amendments to ICARA, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 41, 44-45, 50-56 (2003);
Linda Silberman, Hague InternationalChild Abduction Convention: A Progress Report, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 209, 264-69 (1994).
26. Abduction Convention, supra note 3, art. 3(a), T.I.A.S. No. 11,670 at 4, 1343 U.N.T.S. at

98-99.
27.

Id. art. 5(a), T.I.A.S. No. 11,670 at 5, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 99. Rights of access "include the

right to take a child for a limited period of time to a place other than the child's habitual residence."
Id., art. 5(b).
28. 230 F.3d 450 (lst Cir. 2000).
29. See id at 452, 454,456-59.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2003

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 10

240

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:233

questions of custody and access, unless an exception applies."3 °
Moreover, in applying the doctrine of patria potestas, a civil law
concept incorporated in diluted form in Mexican law (Codigo Civil del
Estado de Baja CaliforniaSur),31 the court of appeals noted that "[c]are
must be taken to avoid imposing American legal concepts onto another
legal culture." 32 The court then found that Mexican law gave both unwed
parents of a child the right to exercise "parental authority" in the absence
of a judicial determination or agreement otherwise.33 Thus, the court
held, "the evidence of patria potestas rights under Mexican law leads us
to conclude that [the father's] rights were 'rights of custody' under the
Convention. While [the mother] had actual custody of [the child], both
parents exercised patria potestas rights over [the child]. 34
Other United States courts have improperly constructed their own
parochial definitions of "custody rights" rather than looking to the
conferral of rights under the law of habitual residence with reference to
the autonomous definition envisioned by the Convention. For example,
in Croll v. Croll,35 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with
the question of whether a ne exeat clause in a custody order of the Hong
Kong court conferred "custody rights" on a non-custodial parent with
rights of access. 36 Notwithstanding the Convention's definition of
"custody rights"-which specifically mentions the right to determine the
child's place of residence-the Second Circuit instead turned to
Webster's Third and Black's Law Dictionaries as the source for a
definition of custody rights. Relying on those definitions, the court then
concluded that "custody of a child entails the primary duty and ability to
choose and give sustenance, shelter, clothing, moral and spiritual
30. Id. at 456.
31. See art. 282 (Mex.). availableat http://www.congresobc.gob.mx/legislacion/estatal/
CODCLV1L.PDF (last visited Mar. 16, 2004).
32. Whallon, 230 F.3d at 456.
33. See id.
at 456-59, 457.
34. Id. at 459; see also Gil v. Rodriguez, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1225 (M.D. Fla. 2002)
(finding Venezuelan law grants both parents "rights of custody" as defined in Convention through
patriapotestas);Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1358 (M.D. Fla. 2002)
(discussing agreement where both parties had "rights of custody" under Argentine law pursuant to
patriapotestas); Pesin v. Osorio Rodriguez, 77 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1286 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (finding
rights of custody where Venezuelan trial court previously ordered both parents "'are vested with the
paternal authority until a judicial decision establishes otherwise"'); Caro v. Sher, 687 A.2d 354, 357
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996) (finding "both parents under Spanish law held joint custody of the
children . . . under the concept of 'patria potestas,' with the children's required residence in Spain.
This is more than 'access' being the only right retained by the petitioner.").
35. 229 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000).
36. The clause granted the non-custodial parent "a veto power over any place of residence outside
Hong Kong." Id. at 135.
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guidance, medical attention, education, etc., or the (revocable) selection
of other people or institutions to give these things. 3 7 The court also
insisted that the right to prevent a child's removal from a country does
not constitute the right to "determine" the child's place of residence.3 8
The reasoning of the panel majority in Croll took precisely the wrong
turn that the First Circuit in Whallon later warned against: applying
American concepts instead of international and Convention norms. As
the perceptive dissent of Judge Sotomayor in Croll observed: "the
construction of an international treaty also requires that we look beyond
parochial definitions to the broader meaning of the Convention, and
assess the 'ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in the light of [the Convention's] object and
purpose.',39 As she explains, the official history and commentary on the
Convention "reflect a notably more expansive conception of custody
rights" than United States/English dictionaries. 40 More specifically, she
points out that a restriction on removal affects the specific choice as to
"whether a child will live in England or Cuba, Hong Kong or the United
States, and it1 is precisely the kind of choice the Convention is designed
to protect.

4

The Second Circuit's error in Croll has been compounded by other
federal courts.42 Most recently, in Fawcett v. McRoberts the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found not only that a restriction on the
custodial father's removal of the child from Scotland under Scottish law
did not create a "right of custody" in the mother, but also that an express
37. Id.at 138-39.
38. See id. at 139-40.
39. Id. at 145 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31.1, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331).
40. Id. at 146 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 147 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
42. See, e.g., Fawcett v. McRoberts, 326 F.3d 491 (4th Cir. 2003) (denying return of child
removed from Scotland by custodial parent on grounds that Scottish law giving non-custodial
parents veto power over the child's removal did not confer custody rights); Gonzalez v. Gutierrez,
311 F.3d 942, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a "ne exeat clause ...does not afford 'rights of
custody' .. . under the [Abduction Convention]"). But see Shealy v. Shealy, 295 F.3d 1117, 112223 (10th Cir. 2002) (assuming that violation of ordinary ne exeat clause would constitute a breach of
"rights of custody" under the Convention, but finding exception in the clause for military necessity
allowing servicewoman mother to move with the child). On the other hand, earlier decisions by state
courts found that ne exeat clauses did create a "right of custody" in the parent who retained control
as to relocation. See e.g., Janakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis, 6 S.W.3d 843, 848-49 (Ky. Ct. App.
1999); David S. v. Zamira S.,574 N.Y.S.2d 429, 432 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1991). Courts in most other
countries have held that ne exeat clauses do create a right of custody, and Croll has been expressly
criticized by the Constitutional Court of South Africa in Sonderup v. Tondelli, 2001 (1) SA 1171
(CC). For a more extensive analysis of this issue, see Silberman, Patching Up the Abduction
Convention, supra note 25, at 45-48.
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undertaking by the father to the Scottish court and recorded by that court
did not give the Scottish court a "right of custody" making the removal
wrongful under the Abduction Convention and giving rise to an
obligation to return the child.43 There can be no clearer violation of the
Convention's mandate against wrongful removals than a removal that
intentionally violates a court's absolute interdiction against leaving the
jurisdiction. Whatever the merits of the debate over ne exeat clauses
more generally, the violation of the court's order in Fawcett must be
considered a breach of custody rights if the Convention is to have any
integrity. In a quite similar scenario, the Canadian Supreme Court, in
Thomson v. Thomson,44 held that a custodial mother's removal of a child
from Scotland to Canada in violation of a non-removal clause in an
interim custody order was in breach of "custody rights" vested in the
Scottish court by reason of ongoing proceedings in Scotland. Justice La
Forest's opinion in Thomson emphasized that Article 3 of the
Convention provides that "custody rights" can be held by "'an institution
or any other body, either jointly or alone,"' and that a non-removal
clause preserves the jurisdiction in the court to decide the merits of
custody issues at a later date.45
At other points, courts have shown greater sensitivity to the need to
depart from domestic concepts within their own legal traditions when
dealing with an international treaty. For example, in determining the
critical issue of habitual residence under the Abduction Convention,
courts have disclaimed the definitions provided in their domestic family
law acts to arrive at concepts more capable of common definition and
that will ensure worldwide consistency. Thus in Chan v. Chow, 4 6 the
Court of Appeal for British Columbia reversed a lower court's finding
that the child was habitually resident in Canada. Rejecting the definition
of habitual residence as it appeared in the provincial Family Relations
Act, the Court of Appeal instead relied on English and other
international precedents for guidance because otherwise "worldwide
consistency in the application of the Convention will be lost.' ' 47 Also in
43. See Fawcett, 326 F.3d at 493, 498-501. The non-custodial mother held a statutory right of veto
over the removal of the child from the United Kingdom as a result of the Children (Scotland) Act. See id.
at 499. The restriction on removal was supplemented by an undertaking made by the father to the
Scottish court and recorded by the court. See id. at 493.
44. [1994] 3 S.C.R. 551 (Can.).
45. Id.at 589. The Fourth Circuit in Fawcett did point out that, in that case, the dispute before the
Scottish court was not over a matter of custody, but involved an application to prohibit the father from
leaving Scotland. See Fawcett,326 F.3d at 500.
46. [2001] 199 D.L.R.4th 478.
47. Id at para. 41.
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the context of evaluating habitual residence, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit issued a similar admonition in Mozes v. Mozes: "To
achieve the uniformity of application across countries, upon which
depends the realization of the Convention's goals, courts must be able to
reconcile their
decisions with those reached by other courts in similar
' 8
situations. A
However, in determining issues implicating the actual physical
safety of the child, such as the interpretation of the defense of grave risk
of physical or psychological harm, the danger of parochialism increases.
What constitutes grave risk is determined by the court hearing the
petition, 49 requiring that court to assess the conditions in the state of
habitual residence and how the parties relate to one another and to their
child. Some courts have continued to emphasize the need to avoid home5 ° the Court of Appeals
state chauvinism. In Friedrich v. Friedrich,
for
the Sixth Circuit reviewed the mother's contention that returning her son
to Germany would cause him psychological harm:
[E]ven if the home of Mr. Friedrich were a grim place to raise a child
in comparison to the pretty, peaceful streets of Ironton, Ohio, that fact
would be irrelevant to a federal court's obligation under the
Convention. We are not to debate the relevant virtues of Batman and
Max und Moritz, Wheaties and Milchreis. The exception for grave

harm to the child is not license for a court in the abducted-to country to
speculate on where the child would be happiest. That decision is a
custody matter,
and reserved to the court in the country of habitual
51
residence.

In dicta, the Sixth Circuit added that "grave risk of harm for the
purposes of the Convention can exist in only two situations[:]" 1) when
the return would place the child in immediate danger, "e.g., returning the
child to a zone of war, famine, or disease," before the underlying
custody dispute could be settled; and, 2) "when the court in the country
of habitual residence, for whatever reason, may be incapable or
unwilling to give the child adequate protection" in "cases
of serious
52
dependence."
emotional
extraordinary
or
neglect,
or
abuse
In hard cases, the temptation to rely on the pervasive and accepted
values of one's own society is difficult to resist. In that context, strong
48.

239 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2001).

49. See Abduction Convention, supra note 3, art. 13(b), T.I.A.S. No. 11,670 at 8-9, 1343
U.N.T.S.at 101.
50. 78 F.3d 1060 (6th Cir. 1996).

51. Id.at 1068.
52. Id.at 1069.
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interests in child protection are likely to outweigh any instinct to
embrace cultural relativism. 3 In Danaipour v. McLarey,5 4 a Swedish
mother, suspecting abuse on the part of the father, removed the children
to the United States where she arranged for an evaluation of the children
for sexual abuse. The district court ordered return, but imposed
conditions-agreed to by the father-that the children would remain
with the mother and that he would have no contact with the children
until the Swedish authorities had conducted an evaluation of the abuse
charges according to established protocols. 55 The Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit reversed, holding that the district court should have
conducted proceedings to determine whether there had been sexual
abuse. The court also expressed doubt about ordering return on the basis
of "undertakings" or "conditional orders," and noted that the condition
requiring the Swedish authorities to follow particular procedures in
conducting their evaluation was unacceptable to the Swedish court.5 6
The First Circuit can be criticized for its view that the role of the district
court was to determine the truth of the abuse allegations; in effect, such a
requirement transforms a Hague case into a full-blown custody
proceeding and evidences a lack of confidence in the courts of other
systems to protect children. On the other hand, the appellate court's
decision reflects its obligation under the Convention to ensure that a
child is not placed in an unsafe environment in case of return.57 If the
court had good reason to distrust the authorities in Sweden to carry out a
serious evaluation of the abuse allegations, the refusal to return was
appropriate. But it would be presumptuous for it to assume that only
authorities in the United States have the necessary competence and
expertise to make a proper inquiry.
Even courts that have given lip service to the principle that a court
faced with a petition for return must examine the "full range of options

53.

See, e.g., Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 218-20 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that the

Abduction Convention does not require immediate threat to child, only a grave risk of harm and that
evidence of spousal abuse and violent acts toward unrelated parties
sufficed to prove grave risk of
harm); Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 33 F. Supp. 2d 456, 459-62 (D. Md. 1999) (finding petitioner's
ongoing physical abuse of child met threshold of grave risk). But see Turner v. Frowein, 752 A.2d

955, 976, 978 (Conn. 2000) (reversing denial of petition for return premised on father's sexual
abuse of child and remanding "for further consideration of the range of placement options and legal
remedies that might allow the child to return to Holland with adequate safeguards for his protection,
pending a final custody determination in due course by a Dutch court with proper jurisdiction").
54.
55.
56.

286 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002).
See id.at 7,11.
Seeid.at19,21-25.

57. See Abduction Convention, supra note 3, arts. 7(b), (h), T.I.A.S. No. 11,670 at 5-6, 1343
U.N.T.S. at 99.
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that might make possible the safe return of a child to the home
country, 58 do not always follow their own mandate. In Blondin v.
DuBois, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit gave undue weight
to the expert testimony of a psychoanalyst in determining that the
children would suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder if forced to
return to their habitual residence.59 A custody hearing in the court of the
state of habitual residence is the appropriate place to assess not only who
will be the best custodian for the child but also what living arrangements
will be most beneficial for the child and whether a parent should be
permitted to relocate and live elsewhere.
One of the legitimate reasons for a refusal to return under the 13(b)
exception is a concern about conditions in the country to which the child
is to be returned. In addition to the 13(b) exception, Article 20 provides
that a state may refuse to return a child if return "would not be permitted
by the fundamental principles of the requested state relating to the
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms." 60 Thus, for
example, a court could refuse to return a child to a country where
fundamental rights cannot be exercised. But it is unlikely that such
a
6
1
Convention.
Abduction
the
to
partner
treaty
a
be
ever
country would
The situation in Israel has revived interest in the "war zone"
example given in Friedrichas a basis for a refusal to return based on the
"grave risk" of harm exception. In Silverman v. Silverman,62 the parties
met in Israel, and each was a dual citizen of Israel and the United States.
The parties had lived in both the United States and Israel, most recently
relocating to Israel, with the mother then coming to the United States
with the two children and failing to return. 63 In ruling on the Hague
application filed by the father, the district court in Silverman found that

58. Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153, 163 n.1 I (2d Cir. 2001).
59. See id at 163. Even the diagnosis of "post-traumatic stress disorder" has been criticized as
enormously subjective and lacking specificity, and its utility as a psychiatric category has been
questioned. See, e.g., Derek Summerfield, The Invention of Post-TraumaticStress Disorder and the
Social Usefulness of a Psychiatric Category, 322 BRIT. MED. J. 95 (2001). In the context of the

Abduction Convention, it is particularly inappropriate because it is the abduction itself that has
created the context for the potential harm.
60.

Abduction Convention, supra note 3, art. 20, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670 at 9, 1343 U.N.T.S. at

101.

61. Countries that were members of the Hague Conference at the time of the adoption of the
Convention can sign and ratify the Convention; other countries may accede to the Convention but
their accession must be accepted by the other States individually. See Abduction Convention, supra
note 3, arts. 37, 38, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670 at 13-14, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 104.

62. 2002 WL 971808 (D. Minn. 2002) [hereinafter Silverman 1], affd 312 F.3d 914 (8th Cir.
2002) [hereinafter Silverman 11], rev'den banc 338 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Silverman III].
63. See Silverman II1,338 F.3d at 889-90.
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the habitual residence of the children never changed from the United
States to Israel and thus, that the children were not wrongfully retained.64
The district court also indicated that it would refuse to return the
children in any event because Israel was too dangerous. 65 The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit initially affirmed the district court, basing
review on a standard of "clear error" and thus deferring to the district
court's factual findings on the question of habitual residence and not
reaching the zone of war issue. 66 On rehearing en banc, however, the
court of appeals, using the broader standard of de novo review, first held
that Israel was the state of habitual residence of the children. 67 That
required the court to then determine whether the defense of "grave risk"
was met. In rejecting that defense, the court of appeals found the mother
could make no particularized showing of grave risk to the children aside
from "general regional violence ... that threaten[s] everyone in Israel. 68
In the absence of "any evidence that these children are in any more
specific danger living in Israel than they were when their mother
voluntarily moved them there in 1999," the court of appeals found no
grave risk to the children inherent in their return to Israel.69
The objective of a common understanding of the norms of the
Abduction Convention is difficult to reach in the absence of a
supranational authority. But a first important step is a recognition that
the Convention transcends national concepts and invites the
development of autonomous standards of interpretation and
implementation. A second is to develop mechanisms to ensure that
decisions ordering return of children under the Convention are carried

64. See Silverman I, WL 971808 at *6.
65. See id.
at *8. That determination of danger was based on a finding that "Israel is currently
in a state of turmoil. Although, as plaintiff testified, Israel has always been a country at conflict to
some extent, it is clear that the intifada has escalated dramatically in recent months." Id. at *8-9. But
see Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1086 n.58 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that when trial court
evaluates grave risk of harm defense on remand it "must be mindful that it is not deciding the
ultimate question of custody ....[It] must determine only whether returning the children to Israel
for long enough for the Israeli courts to make the custody determination will be physically or
psychologically risky to them."); Freier v. Freier, 969 F. Supp. 436, 443 (E.D. Mich. 1996)
(rejecting contention that Israel was a "zone of war" and assertion of grave risk defense, finding
"that the fighting is limited to certain areas and does not directly involve the city where the child
resides").
66. See Silverman 1l,
312 F.3d at 916-17.
67. See Silverman 111,
338 F.3d at 889, 896-97.
68. Id.at 901.
69. Id.
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out.70 Two recent rulings by the European Court of Human Rights have
found violations of the European Convention on Human Rights and
awarded damages against countries for failure of their authorities to
enforce final orders of return made under the Abduction Convention by
their courts.71 International law has come to recognize the obligation of
states to make accommodations of nationalist interests in service of
principles of universal importance-preventing the abduction of
children-in a globalized world.

II.

SAME-SEX UNIONS

Another area where principles of private international law
accommodate competing values as regards family relationships is with
respect to same-sex marriage and/or analogous models of registered
domestic partnership. The issue has a domestic analogue in the United
States when a state is asked to honor a same-sex marriage or partnership
arrangement entered into in a sister state. 72 When a state makes the
social and legal decision to bestow a special status of "marriage" or
"partnership" on a particular relationship, it is making a statement about
its set of values for a particular community. A state or country makes
that judgment, not for the world at large, but for a relevant community in
which it has an interest. In looking at private international law rules with
respect to marriage more generally, it is interesting that many civil law
countries adopt a "personal law" standard. In effect, the substantive
requirements for contracting a marriage are determined for each person
by the law of nationality, or in some cases habitual residence or
domicile. Persons of foreign nationality, or in some cases habitual
residence or domicile, may not contract a marriage before they have
presented a certificate from their state of origin showing that there are no
impediments to the marriage according to the laws of that state.73 Such

70. Often, even when a Hague proceeding results in an order of return, as many as a quarter of
those orders are not enforced. See Linda Silberman, The Hague Child Abduction Convention Turns
Twenty: Gender Politicsand Other Issues, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 221, 247-48 (2000).
71. See Sylvester v. Austria, Nos. 36812/97 & 40104/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2003) (finding Austria
in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights Article 8's right to respect for family life

for failure to enforce a final order of return of children to the United States); Ignaccolo-Zenide v.
Romania, No. 31679/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2000) (holding Romania in breach of Article 8 for failure to
take adequate and sufficient steps in effecting an order of return).
72. See generally Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage,Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional
Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1997); Linda J. Silberman, Can the Islandof Hawaii Bind
the World? A Comment on Same-Sex Marriage and Federalism Values, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 191
(1996).
73. See, e.g., § 1309 Btrgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] (F.R.G.).
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requirements are not usually imposed by states in the United States,
although there are exceptions. Wyoming, for example, makes it the duty
of the clerk issuing the marriage license to inquire "whether there is any
legal impediment to the parties entering into the marriage contract
according to the laws of the state of their residence., 74 Massachusetts
has a similar rule prohibiting the marriage of "a party residing and
intending to continue to reside in another jurisdiction if such marriage
would be void if contracted in such other jurisdiction" and declaring any
such marriage "null and void., 75 A related provision of Massachusetts
law requires the official issuing the marriage license to "satisfy himself,
by requiring affidavits or otherwise, that such person is not prohibited
from intermarrying by the laws of the jurisdiction where he or she
resides. 76 The requirements of such a domiciliary nexus reflect a respect
for the regulatory interests and values of the community of which each
member of the couple is a part. It also reduces the likelihood that the
validity of the marriage will be called into question at a future time.77
74. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-103(b) (Michie 1977). If one or both of the parties cannot meet
this requirement, he or she may apply for a judicial waiver. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-105(a)
(Michie 1975).
75. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 11 (1998); see also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/217 (1977);
N.H. REV. STAT. § 457:44 (1979).
76. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 12 (1998); see also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/218 (1977).
Sections II and 12 are to "be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate their general purpose to
make uniform the law of those states which enact like legislation." MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 13
(1998). Should an official issue a marriage license with the knowledge that one or both of the
parties could not marry in his or her home jurisdiction, he or she "shall be punished by a fine of not
less than one hundred or more than five hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one
year, or both." MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 50 (1998). In light of recent decisions by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, discussed infra, these statutes have taken on new meaning.
77. The law on recognition of marriage in many European countries also incorporates
elements of nationality. See, e.g., Bundesgesetz Ober das Internationale Privatrecht, Loi f~dral sur
le droit internationale priv6, Legge federale sul diritto internazionale private [Federal Law on
Private International Law] art. 45(2), 291 SR 101, 291 RS 101, 291 RS 101 (Switz. 1987) (stating
that foreign marriage where one party is a Swiss citizen, or where both parties are Swiss
domiciliaries, is recognized unless marriage was performed abroad to evade Swiss law), available at
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/c29l .html, and reprintedin PIERRE A. KARRER & KARL W. ARNOLD,
SWITZERLAND'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW STATUTE 66 (1989) (English translation); Codice
Civile [C.C.], art. 27 (Italy) (stating that validity of "process" is governed by the laws of the place
where such "process" was performed), available at http://www.jus.unitn.it/cardozo/ObiterDictum/
codciv/Prel.htm; Art. 13 Einftihrungsgesetz zum Btirgerlichen Gesetzbuche (F.R.G.). For a general
survey on marriage recognition rules, see Special Symposium on International Marriage and
Divorce Regulation and Recognition, 29 FAM. L.Q. 495 (1995). Without consideration of the
impediments to marriage under the law of the nationality of the parties, a marriage of a national may
not be recognized by a State that imposed an impediment to marriage by that individual. See
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, SWEDEN, FAMILY LAW: INFORMATION ON THE RULES 9-10 (2000) (stating
"that the consideration of impediments to marriage will have taken place in accordance with
Swedish law" and that therefore "there is a risk that such a marriage may be invalid in the country
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A.

The EuropeanExperience

The recent expansion of laws with respect to same-sex partnerships
in Europe reflect similar limitations in looking to the "community"
affected by these new arrangements. For example, both Belgium (as of
2003) and the Netherlands (as of 2001) have expanded their definition of
marriage to include same-sex couples and now permit formal marriages
between members of the same sex.78 In the Netherlands, only one of the
spouses must be a citizen or resident (residency requires formal
registration) of the Netherlands, whereas Belgium requires that such
marriages be allowed by the national law of each partner. 79 Thus, at this
point in time, the Belgian law permits same-sex marriage only between
Belgians or between a Belgian and a Dutch national. As discussed in
Section B(3), infra, Canadians may soon be added to that list. One can
see in these "private international rules" an attempt to accommodate
competing views of different communities about the appropriateness of a
same-sex marriage. In the context of heterosexual marriage, the
multilateral treaty on marriage-the Hague Convention on Celebration
and Recognition of the Validity of Marriage-includes provisions that
reflect the need to accommodate different social norms about marriage
that may exist in various countries. 80 The particular legal regime and
where the foreigner is a citizen or in another country"), available at http://wwwjustitie.regeringen.
se/inenglish/pressinfo/pdf/famlaw.pdf.
78. See Loi ouvrant le mariage A des personnes de meme sexe et modifiant certaines
dispositions du Code civil, Wet tot openstelling van het huwelijk voor personen van hetzelfde
geslacht en tot wijziging van een aantal bepalingnen van het Burgerlijk Wetboek [Law opening
marriage to persons of the same sex and amending certain provisions of the Civil code], ch. I, art. 3
(2003) [hereinafter Belgian Law on Same-Sex Marriage], reprinted in 173 Moniteur Beige,
Belgisch Staatsblad [Stb.] 9825, 9880, availableat http://www.juridat.be/cgi-loi/legislation.pl; Wet
openstelling huwelijk [Law opening marriage], art. LE, 2001 Staatsblad [Stb.] 9 (2001), available at
http://www.justitie.nl/pers/persberichten/archief/2000/huwelijk.pdf. For an in-depth discussion of
the development of the Dutch law, see Nancy G. Maxwell, Opening Civil Marriage to Same-Gender
Couples: A Netherlands-United States Comparison, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 141, 142-57
(2001).
79. See Belgian Law on Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 78, ch. II, art. 7; see also MINISTRY
OF JUSTICE, NETHERLANDS, MARRIAGE, REGISTERED PARTNERSHIP AND COHABITATION 4 (2003)
[hereinafter MARRIAGE,
REGISTERED PARTNERSHIP AND COHABITATION],
available at

http://www.justitie.nl/english/Images/23_34638.pdf.
80. See Convention on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages, March 14,
1978, arts. 3, 11, 14, 16 I.L.M. 18. Only six States have joined the Convention, possibly because
some of the provisions seem overly complex. See Hague Conference on Private International Law,
Full Status Report Convention #26, available at http://www.hcch.net/e/status/stat26e.html (last
modified Nov. 28, 1998). Article 3 of the Convention imposes the following requirements as to
where a marriage "shall be celebrated": "(1) where the future spouses meet the substantive
requirements of the internal law of the State of celebration and one of them has the nationality of
that State or habitually resides there, or (2) where each of the future spouses meets the substantive
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status for a relationship is appropriate for those with strong ties-here
reflected through residency or citizenship requirements-to the
community that sanctions them.
The same sensitivities emerge in many of the laws in Europe
establishing registered domestic partnerships. 81 The domestic partnership
laws do not create rights coextensive with those of married couples, and
the laws of the different countries on this subject vary in particular ways.
For example, rights under the Netherlands domestic partnership law are
broader than those under the new German domestic partnership law,
which grants certain rights to same-sex "life partners" but is more
limited than those granted to married couples.8 2 Domestic partners in
Germany cannot adopt unrelated children as a couple 83 whereas they
now can do so in the Netherlands (though only children who have their
normal residence in the Netherlands).8 4 The Danish Registered
requirements of the internal law designated by the choice of law rules of the State of celebration."
Under Article 11, a "Contracting State may refuse to recognize the validity of a marriage only
where, at the time of the marriage, under the law of that State," impediments to the marriage
existed. Those impediments include a prior marriage, certain consanguinity/affinity relationships,
age restrictions, lack of mental capacity, and lack of consent. Under Article 14, a State can also
"refuse to recognize the validity of a marriage where such recognition is manifestly incompatible
with its public policy."
81.

See Symposium, Queer Law 2000: Current Issues in Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and

TransgenderLaw, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 137, 191-96 (2001) (remarks of Dr. Yuval
Merin); Symposium, Chroniclinga Movement: A Symposium to Recognize the Twentieth Anniversary of

the Lesbian/Gay Law Notes, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J.HUM. RTS. 403, 712-13, 719-30 (2000) (remarks of
Nancy D. Polikoff).
82. Compare Wet van 5 juli 1997 [Law of July 5, 1997], Stb. 324 (1997), and Wet van 17
December 1997 [Law of Dec. 17, 1997], SIb. 600 (1998), with Gesetz zur Beendigung der
Diskriminierung gleichgeschlechtlicher Gemeinschaften: Lebenspartnershaften
(Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz) [Law to End Discrimination of Same-Sex Communities: Life
Partnerships (Life Partnership Law)], v. 16.2.2001 (BGBI. 1 266). The Lebenspartnerschaftgesetz
entered into force on August 1, 2001 after the Federal Constitutional Court rejected challenges
brought by Bavaria and Saxony. See I BvQ 23/01 (BVerfG July 18, 2001). A further constitutional
challenge by Bavaria, Saxony, and Thuringia was also rejected. See I BvF 1/01, IBvF 2/02
(BVerfG July 17, 2002).
83. See Lebenspartnerschafisgesetz,supra note 82, art. 1, § 9, BGBI. I at 267; § 1741 11BGB
(providing that unmarried persons can only adopt individually and that, generally, married persons
can only adopt jointly); see also BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ, LEGISLATION ON SAME SEX
PARTNERSHIPS-THE NEW LAWS ON REGISTERED PARTNERSHIPS (2003) (stating that although
"matrimonial law provisions ... created in view of joint children ... could not serve as ... a

model" for registered partnerships, "[a] parent's sexual orientation is of no relevance" to adopting
children; gays and lesbians can, as "unmarried [men] or [women,] adopt a child when the usual
requirements of adoption law ...are fulfilled"), at http://www.bmj.bund.de/eng/themes/familylaw/
10000 146 (last visited Jan. 6, 2003).
84. See MARRIAGE, REGISTERED PARTNERSHIP AND COHABITATION, supra note 79, at 12
(stating that "couples of the same sex or different sexes can adopt a child that is habitually resident
in the Netherlands ...regardless of whether the couple are married, registered partners or living
together"); Arjan Schippers, Wedding Bells for Dutch Gay Couples, RADIO NETH.
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Partnership Act, which also applies only to same-sex relationships,
establishes most of the same rights and responsibilities between
domestic partners as for spouses; the notable exception is the right to
adopt. 85

Procreation is often cited as a primary reason for marriage, and the
extension of the right to adopt to same-sex couples is a touchstone for
the further evolution of domestic partnership laws.8 6 When enacted in
1989 as the first law of its kind, the Danish Registered Partnership Act
precluded same-sex couples from adopting children.87 Effective July 1,
1999, however, the law was amended to allow adoption by one partner
of the other partner's child. Children may still not be adopted by
registered partners as a couple. In addition, a domestic partner cannot
adopt the child of his or her domestic partner if that child was originally

The
WERELDOMROEP, Aug. 15, 2001, at http://www.mw.nl/society/html/mainOI0815.html.
rationale behind the residency restriction is "the fear that international adoption agencies might stop
cooperation with The Netherlands completely." Id.; see also Dutch Pass Same-Sex Marriage Laws:
Gay Couples Can Adopt, NAT'L POST, Dec. 20, 2000, at A12, available at 2000 WL 30653148.
85. See Danish Registered Partnership Act, Act No. 372 of June 1, 1989, § 4(1) (Den.) [hereinafter
Danish Registered Partnership Act] (last amended by Danish Act Amending the Danish Registered
Partnership Act, Act No. 360 of June 2, 1999 [hereinafter Amended Danish Registered Partnership Act].
An English translation of the original text of the law is available at http://www.qrd.org/qrd/world/europe/
denmark/registered.partnership.act.with.amendments. The full text of the Danish Registered
Partnership Act as amended is available in English translation at http://www.civildir.dk/regler/
regipartnership.htm.
86. See, e.g., BUNDESMINtSTERIUM DER JUSTIZ, supra note 83 ("Marriage constitutes a longterm relationship between a man and a woman involving sexual relations, one of the purposes of
this institution being to have children and bring them up.") available at http://www.bmj.bund.de/
eng/themes/familylaw/10000146. When asked why the Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetzdoes not make
provision for the adoption of children by registered domestic partners, Herta Daubler-Gmelin, thc
then Minister of Justice for the Federal Republic of Germany, explained that registered partnerships
were conceived of as a separate legal institution and were not intended to detract from marriage. As
such, the laws governing adoption, custody, and visitation, unless otherwise provided by the
Lebenspartnerschafisgesetz, do not apply. See Eine Stufenregelung ist verniinftig, HINNERK
(Germany) (Jan. 2000), availableat http://www.bmj.bund.de/frames/ger/themen/familienrecht/
In most European countries,
10000148/index.html?sid=3eacd3905d6cfclf78dc2ea196964913.
lesbian registered partners are precluded from access to artificial insemination. See, e.g., Lag om
registrerat partnerskap [Law on registered partnerships], ch. 3, § 2 (Swed. 1994) [hereinafter
Swedish Registered Partnership Act], reprinted in 1994 Svensk forfattningssamling [SFS] 1117,
availableat http://www.riksdagen.se/debatt/sfst/index.asp; MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, SWEDEN, supra
note 77, at 27; MINISTRY OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY AFFAIRS, NORWAY, REGISTERED
PARTNERSHIP: ACT No. 40 OF 30 APRIL 1993 RELATING TO REGISTERED PARTNERSHIP 7 (2001),
available at http://odin.dep.no/archive/bfdbilder/01/O3/PartnOll.pdf. A discussion of access to
artificial insemination is beyond the scope of this article, however.
87. See Danish Registered Partnership Act, supra note 85, § 4(1); see also The Danish Adoption
(Consolidation) Act, § 5(2) (stating that "[o]nly legally married couples may adopt together."), available
at http://www.civildir.dk/regler/danish-adoption-act.htm.
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adopted from a foreign country. The second domestic partnership
registration law, the Norwegian "Act No. 40 of 30 April 1993 Relating
to Registered Partnership" also originally precluded any joint or
individual adoption by registered partners but was amended effective
January 1, 2002 to allow one domestic partner to adopt the child of the
other.89 Sweden followed suit, and the Swedish Registered Partnership
Act, which took effect on January 1, 1995, also precluded registered
partners from "jointly [or] individually adopt[ing] children." 90 In June of
2002, Swedish legislators approved a bill to allow registered partners to
adopt each other's children and also jointly to adopt children, who have
their habitual residence in Sweden or abroad. 91 Being the first country to
allow registered partners to adopt children jointly did not come without
consequence, however. As a result, effective January 4, 2003,92 Sweden
withdrew from the European Convention on the Adoption of Children
which provides that "[t]he law shall not permit a child to be adopted
except by
either two persons married to each other ... or by one
93
person."
Countries thus make different judgments about the role of legal
status and rights of same-sex relationships, and the way to accommodate
the value judgments inherent in the legal status is to think seriously
about the nature of the community in which they should apply. In the
Netherlands, the Dutch registered partnership law was amended from
requiring both partners to be Dutch citizens or residents to allow
registration if only one partner is a Dutch resident or citizen. 94 The
88. See Amended Danish Registered Partnership Act, supra note 85, § 4(l) (amending Danish
Registered Partnership Act to allow one partner to "adopt the other partner's child unless it is an
adopted child from another country").
89.

MINISTRY OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY AFFAIRS, NORWAY, supra note 86, at 6.

90. See Swedish Registered Partnership Act, supra note 86, Chap. 3, § 2. An unofficial
English translation of the original act is available at http://www.france.qrd.org/texts/partnership/se/
Sweden-act.html (last modified Apr. 24, 1998).
91. See Kim Gamel, Sweden's Parliament Approves Proposal Letting Same-Sex Couples
Adopt Children, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, June 5, 2002.
92. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CHART OF SIGNATURES AND RATIFICATIONS OF A TREATY:
EUROPEAN
CONVENTION
ON
THE
ADOPTION
OF
CHILDREN,
available
at

http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/searchsig.asp?NT=058 (last visited Jan. 8, 2004); see also
Press Release, Council of Europe, Sweden Denounces the European Convention on the Adoption of
Children (July 3, 2002), available at http://www.coe.int/T/e/Com/Press/Convention/
20020703 Sweden.asp. Although some Member States of the Council of Europe, Belgium, Finland,
and the Netherlands, are not parties to the European Convention on the Adoption of Children,
Denmark, Germany, and Norway are. See CHART OF SIGNATURES AND RATIFICATIONS, supra.
93. European Convention on the Adoption of Children, Apr. 24, 1967, art. 6(1), No. 58, 1
Europ. T.S. 692, 694.
94. See Wet van 21 december 2000 [Law of Dec. 21, 2000], 2001 Stb. 11 (2001); see also
Kees Waaldijk, Latest News About Same-Sex Marriage in the Netherlands (discussing the
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Danish law originally provided that "both or one of the parties [had to
have] his permanent residence in Denmark and [be] of Danish
nationality., 95 Effective July 1, 1999, the law was amended to allow
non-citizen partners to register if both partners resided in Denmark for
the preceding two years. If one partner is a citizen and a resident, the
partners can also register as before. Moreover, citizens of countries with
laws similar to Denmark are treated as having the equivalent of Danish
citizenship for the purpose of determining eligibility to enter into a
registered domestic partnership in Denmark. 96 The French Pacte Civil de
Solidarit ("PaCS")---a partnership arrangement which applies to both
same-sex and opposite-sex couples-requires both parties to be residents
of France for eligibility.97 The German law forms a notable exception to
this general trend as it does not require German nationality, residence, or

amendment), available at http://athena.leidenuniv.ni/rechten/meijers/index.php3?m=l 0&c=76&
garb=0.5 101220570444123 &session=.
95. Danish Registered Partnership Act, supra note 85, § 2(2); see also Marianne Hojgaard
Pedersen, Denmark: Homosexual Marriages and New Rules Regarding Separation and Divorce, 30
J. FAM. L. 289, 290 (1991-92) (explaining that the reason for residency and citizenship requirements
was "that a registered partnership in all probability will not be recognized abroad").
96. Section 2(2) of the Amended Danish Partnership Act provides as follows:
(2) A partnership can only be registered if
1) either of the parties is resident in this country and is a Danish national; or
2) both parties were resident in this country during the two years immediately
preceding the registration.
(3) Norwegian, Swedish or Iceland[ic] nationality shall be treated as equivalent to
Danish nationality in accordance with paragraph 1) of subsection (2). The Minister of
Justice may determine that nationality in another country having passed legislation on
registered partnership equivalent to the Danish legislation shall be treated as equivalent
to Danish nationality.
See also Nat'l Agency for Enter. & Hous. of Denmark, International Career-Working and Living
in Denmark, Family, Relationships, Registered Partnership: Entering Into a Registered Partnership
in Denmark (stating that "[t]o be allowed to enter into [a] registered partnership in Denmark, at least
one of the two parties must be a Danish citizen and a resident of Denmark, or both parties must have
been residents of Denmark for at least two years. Citizens of Norway, Sweden, Iceland, Finland and
Holland equate to Danish citizens in this respect"), available at http://www.workindenmark.dk/
relationships/0/7.
97. See Loi no. 99-944 du 15 novembre 1999 relative au pacte civil de solidarit6, codified in
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] arts. 515-1, 515-3 (Fr.), available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr; Queer Law
2000: Current Issues in Lesbian, Gay. Bisexual, and Transgender Law, supra note 81, at 198
(remarks of Dr. Yuval Merin). The legislative history of PaCS reveals that the focus of the
legislation was to provide "economic security to those who cannot or do not want to marry."
Chronicling a Movement: A Symposium to Recognize the Twentieth Anniversary of the Lesbian/Gay Law
Notes, supra note 81, at 726 (remarks of Nancy D. Polikofi). The statute does not address custody or
adoption, and thus "[n]ot only are lesbian and gay couples unable to jointly adopt children, they are
unable to obtain joint parental authority over the child of one person in the couple, a status available
to cohabitating heterosexual couples." Id.
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domicile of one or both the same-sex partners, who wish to register.
The German conflict of laws rules provide that the law of the state where
the partnership was registered governs, including the formation and
dissolution of the partnership. 99 Thus, as long as the same-sex partners
are eligible under the Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz,they may register in
Germany regardless of whether their countries of nationality, residence,
or domicile allow same-sex registered partnerships or would have
allowed these particular partners to register. l00 Of course, the German
law cannot ensure recognition outside of Germany.
When communities have similar values, one can expect the kind of
result that has occurred among the Nordic countries-agreement for
mutual recognition of registered partnerships. 10 1 These states recognize,
however, that other states may not share the values expressed in their
domestic partnership legislation.10 2 For example, even after the 1999

98. See PETER MANKOWSKI, Einftihrungsgesetzzum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch/IPR: Art 1317b EGBGB, in J. VON STAUDINGERS KOMMENTAR ZUM BORGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH MIT
EINFOHRUNGSGESETZ UND NEBENGESETZEN Rn. 2-3 (14th ed. 2003); MARINA WELLENHOFERKLEIN, DIE EINGETRAGENE LEBENSPARTNERSCHAFT 32 (2003).

99. See EGBGB, art. 17b (1).
100. See MANKOWSKI, supra note 98, at Rn. 2-3; WELLENHOFFER-KLEIN, supra note 98. Such
an approach is in marked contrast to the provisions governing marriages of foreigners in Germany,
which emphasize the personal law model. See supra notes 73, 77. This shift is explained by the
practical impossibility of a foreign national being able to produce a certificate of eligibility to enter
into a registered domestic partnership from a State that does not have or recognize the institution of
registered domestic partnerships. WELLENHOFFER-KLEIN, supra note 98.
101. Finland was the last of the Nordic countries to approve a registered domestic partnership law,
and the law entered into force on March 1,2002. See No Rush for Finnish PartnershipRegistration,
NORDIC Bus. REP. Feb. 18, 2002, available at 2002 WL 3646481. Finland's residency requirement is
like that of several other Nordic countries: at least one of the parties must be a Finnish citizen and a
habitual resident in Finland or both parties must have been a habitual resident in Finland for two years
immediately before the registration. See Act on Registered Partnerships, § 10(1) [hereinafter Finnish
Registered Partnership Act], available at http://www.finlex.fi/pdf/saadkaan/E0010950.PDF (unofficial
English translation). Also, like other Nordic countries, citizenship in a foreign State whose legislation
allows for registration of domestic partnerships is equivalent to Finnish citizenship for the purpose of
establishing eligibility to enter into a registered domestic partnership in Finland. See Finnish Registered
Partnership Act, supra, § 10(2); see also MINISTRY OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY AFFAIRS, NORWAY,
supra note 86, § 2(1) (providing that a couple may register if "one of the parties is a Norwegian national
and one of them is resident in Norway" and that "[b]eing a national of Denmark, Iceland or Sweden is
considered equivalent to being a Norwegian national"). See also discussion of Danish provision, supra
note 96. The Finnish legislation includes a unique provision with respect to recognition of foreign
domestic partnerships. A foreign domestic partnership will be recognized in Finland if it is valid in the
State where it was registered. See Finnish Registered Partnership Act, supra, § 12. The recognition
provision is consistent with both the parties' expectations and the interests of the relevant communities in
that most domestic partnership laws require a residency nexus by one or both of the parties. An
interesting issue would be presented if the registered partnership were valid in the State where registered
but that State had no residency requirement, such as Germany.
102. For example, the Swedish Ministry of Justice advises its citizens as follows:
A partnership that is registered in Sweden may [as of October 1,1998] not be expected
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revisions, the Danish Registered Partnership Act continues to provide
that "[p]rovisions of international treaties shall not apply to registered
03
partnerships unless this is accepted by the other contracting parties."'
When the Netherlands opened marriage to same-sex couples, the Dutch
parliament warned that "married Dutch gays should not assume that their
unions would be recognized abroad, since the notion of marriage is
usually interpreted in international treaties as uniting a man and a
woman."'' 0 4 In Germany, the conflict of laws rules provide that same-sex
partnerships registered outside of Germany will not be given any greater

to have full legal effect outside Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Iceland and the Netherlands.
However, one cannot exclude the possibility that authorities and courts in a country
where there are no corresponding provisions may, in an individual matter, take the legal
effects of a registered partnership into account, in any case to the extent that there is no
opposing interest claimed.... It is also important for the parties to be aware of the risk
of a registered partnership being ignored abroad.
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, SWEDEN, supra note 77, at 27. Where the host country does not oppose it,
however, "Swedish citizens will be able to register for same-sex partnerships" at Swedish
embassies. Assoc. Press, Sweden Allows Same-Sex Marriages To Be Performed at Three of Its
Embassies, May 28, 2003 available at http://www.gmax.co.za/look/archivedstories/2003/0528sweden.html. The Norwegian Ministry of Children and Family Affairs is even more blunt as to the
legal status of registered partners abroad: "A registered partnership contracted in Norway is not
normally recognized in countries which do not have comparable legislation. A registered
partnership therefore has no legal consequences outside Norway." MINISTRY OF CHILDREN AND
FAMILY AFFAIRS, NORWAY, supra note 86, at 9. A recent case before the European Court of Justice

illustrates this point. In D. v. Council, the ECJ upheld the Council of the European Union's refusal
to recognize the registered partner of a Swedish official of the Council of the European Union for
the purpose of awarding a household allowance over protests by Sweden, Denmark, and the
Netherlands. See Case C-122/99 P, D. v. Council, 39 (ECJ 2001) ("It follows that the fact that, in
a limited number of Member States, a registered Partnership is assimilated, although incompletely,
to marriage cannot have the consequence that, by mere interpretation, persons whose legal status is
distinct from that of marriage can be covered by the term 'married [sic] official as used in the Staff
Regulations."), available at http://curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang-en&Submit-Submit&
docrequire=alldocs&numaff=C- 122%2F99+P&datefs=&datefe=&nomusuel=&domaine=&mots=&
resmax=100. Decisions such as D. v. Council may be short-lived if the European Parliament's
recent recommendation is ever put into effect. "In its annual report on human rights, the European
Parliament recommended that gays be allowed to marry and adopt children." World Briefing:
Europe. European ParliamentSupports Gay Marriage,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2003, at A10.
103. Amended Danish Registered Partnership Act, supra note 85, § 4(4); see also Pedersen, supra
note 95, at 290 (explaining that this "provision[] require[s] the other country's approval of a
registered partnership or the parties in a registered partnership will not be placed on an equal footing
with spouses."). In the same vein, the Danish Act was not automatically applicable to Greenland
and the Faroe Islands "but may by Royal Decree be made effective in whole or in part for these
provinces subject to such deviations as are dictated by the special circumstances of Greenland and
the Faroe Islands." Amended Danish Registered Partnership Act, supra note 85, § 7.
104. Same-Sex Dutch Couples Gain Marriage and Adoption Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20,
2000, at A8.
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effect than that foreseen by the German Civil Code and the
Lebenspartnerschafisgesetzitself.'0 5
One further aspect of registered partnership law that raises
questions about the role of an "interested" community comes in the
context of the dissolution of a registered partnership. In the Nordic and
German schemes, the place where the partnership was registered retains
06
an interest in the partnership and provides a forum for dissolution.1
Thus, partners, who wish to dissolve their partnership, always have a
jurisdiction in which to do so.
B. The Vermont Civil Union
In the United States, currently only one state-Vermont-has
legislation authorizing civil unions. The backdrop for the Vermont
statute was a decision by the Vermont Supreme Court that same-sex
couples were entitled to a right to marry or its equivalent;'0 7 to meet that

105. See EGBGB, art. 17b (4); see also MANKOWSKI, supra note 98, at Rn. 22-23, 83-86
(explaining that, for example, same-sex marriage pursuant to Dutch law would be treated not as
marriage but as having same effect as German registered domestic partnership in Germany).
106. See, e.g., Amended Danish Registered Partnership Act, supra note 85, § 5(3); Finnish
Registered Partnership Act, supra note 101, ch. 4, § 13(1), (2) (providing also that "dissolution of a
[foreign] registered partnership may be ruled admissible in Finland, if... the partner has such a
connection to Finland that a Finnish court would have jurisdiction in divorce proceedings"); Swedish
Registered Partnership Act, supra note 86, ch. 2, § 4; MINISTRY OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY
AFFAIRS, NORWAY, supra note 86, at 2; EGBGB, art. 17b (1) (providing that law of registering State
governs partnership's dissolution), §661 Nr. (3)(1) Zivilprozellordnung [ZPO] (F.R.G.) (providing
that German courts have jurisdiction to dissolve registered partnerships if one partner is habitually
resident in or partnership itself was registered in Germany). The California Domestic Partner Rights
and Responsibilities Act of 2003, which takes effect on January 1, 2005, takes a different approach. In
addition to imposing the requirement that the partners share a common residence, each must declare
that he or she consents to the jurisdiction of the Superior Courts of Califomia for the
purpose of a proceeding to obtain a judgment of dissolution or nullity of the domestic
partnership or for legal separation of partners in the domestic partnership, or for any
other proceeding related to the partners' rights and obligations, even if one or both
partners ceases to be a resident of, or to maintain a domicile in, this state.
§§ 3,5, 2003 Cal. Legis. Serv. 421 (West).
107. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999). In Baker, the Vermont Supreme Court,
interpreting the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution, held same-sex couples "may
not be deprived of the statutory benefits and protections afforded persons of the opposite sex who
choose to marry" and "required [the state] to extend to same-sex couples the common benefits and
protections that flow from marriage under Vermont law." Id.; see generally, Barbara J. Cox, But
Why Not Marriage: An Essay on Vermont's Civil Unions Law, Same-Sex Marriage, and Separate
But (Un)Equal, 25 VT. L. REV. 113 (2000); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Equality Practice. Liberal
Reflections on the Jurisprudence of Civil Unions, 64 ALB. L. REV. 853 (2001); Greg Johnson,
Vermont Civil Unions. The New Language of Marriage,25 VT. L. REV. 15 (2000); Mark Strasser,
Baker and Some Recipes for Disaster: On DOMA, Covenant Marriages,and Full Faith and Credit
Jurisprudence,64 BROOK. L. REV. 307 (1998).
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mandate, the Vermont legislature proceeded to enact a statute
authorizing civil unions.10 8 The Vermont statute does not require
residency or domicile of one or both of the parties for the registration of
a civil union. However, like most divorce/dissolution statutes in the
United States, Vermont's imposes a residency requirement to bring such
a proceeding.10 9 Vermont will only take jurisdiction over such an action
if either party to the marriage [or civil union] has resided within the
state for a period of six months or more, but a divorce shall not be
decreed for any cause, unless the plaintiff or the defendant has
1 10 resided
in the state one year next preceding the date of final hearing.
These limitations may leave the parties in limbo and their rights
uncertain. In Rosengarten v. Downes,t"t ' the parties entered into a civil
union in Vermont on New Year's Eve 2000 even though neither party
was or is a resident of Vermont. Six months later, plaintiff brought an
action to dissolve the civil union in his state of residence, Connecticut.
Defendant no longer resided in Connecticut and was believed to be in
New York.1 12 The Connecticut trial court dismissed the action for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and the appellate court aptly captured the
108. An Act Relating to Civil Unions, 2000 VT. ACTS& RESOLVES 91 (codified at VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207). In Baker, the Vermont Supreme Court did not mandate that same-sex couples be
allowed to marry but rather held that "[wihether [the extension of statutory protections to same-sex
couples) ultimately takes the form of inclusion within the marriage laws themselves or a parallel
'domestic partnership' system or some equivalent statutory alternative, rests with the Legislature.
Whatever system is chosen, however, must conform with the constitutional imperative to afford all
Vermonters the common benefit, protection, and security of the law." 744 A.2d at 867. The Vermont
civil union law provides that "[p]arties to a civil union shall have all the same benefits, protections
and responsibilities under law, whether they derive from statute, administrative or court rule, policy,
common law or any other source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage." Tit. 15,
§ 1204(a). The civil union statute nonetheless defines marriage as "the legally recognized union of one
man and one woman." Id. § 1201(4). Vermont also enacted a reciprocal beneficiaries statute "to
provide two persons who are blood-relatives or related by adoption the opportunity to establish a
consensual reciprocal beneficiaries relationship so they may receive the benefits and protections and
be subject to the responsibilities that are granted to spouses" in the areas of medical decisionmaking and abuse prevention. Id.§ 1301(a).
109. For an overview of state residency requirements, see Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector,
A Review of the Year in Family Law: IncreasedMobility Creates Conflicts, 36 FAM. L.Q. 515, 562
(2003).
110. Tit. 15, § 592; see also tit. 15, § 1206 (providing that "[t]he dissolution of civil unions shall
follow the same procedures and be subject to the same substantive rights and obligations that are
involved in the dissolution of marriage... including any residency requirements."). Vermont legislators
deliberately included the residency requirement "'to parallel the marriage laws.... That's the way the
Legislature at the time decided it was best to address the issue, quirks and all."' Sarah Schweitzer, Civil
Unions in Vermont Easier to Enter Than Exit, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 15, 2002, at Al (quoting
Representative Peg Flory, Chair, Judiciary Committee, Vermont House of Representatives).
Ill. 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
112. See id.
at 172-73, 179.
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issue: "If Connecticut does not recognize the validity of such a union,
then there is no res to address and dissolve." ' 13 Although acknowledging
that plaintiff had "a significant set of contacts with [Connecticut]," the
appellate court affirmed the trial court, holding "that a civil union is not
a family relations matter" and that the Connecticut court "had no subject
matter jurisdiction to dissolve the civil union." ' 1 4 The Connecticut
Supreme Court certified the question of whether "the [a]ppellate [c]ourt
properly conclude[d] that the trial court had no subject matter
jurisdiction to dissolve a civil union entered into pursuant to the laws of
Vermont."" t5 The issue of jurisdiction over the dissolution abated at
plaintiffs death,' 6 but the question of inheritance rights-the very
reason the plaintiff initiated 8the dissolution action" 7-may still be the
subject of further litigation."t
Rosengarten will not be the last example of a litigant left without a
forum for dissolution. Of the 5,378 civil unions entered into in Vermont
as of March 2003, fourteen have been dissolved in Vermont." t9 In
situations where the parties were and are not residents of Vermont,
rulings like Rosengarten are even more likely in states that have adopted
state "defense of marriage" acts.120 Domicile of one or both of the parties
113. Id. at 172-73, 175.
114. Id. at 178-79, 184. The appellate court also found that Connecticut public policy does not
"favor[] the recognition of civil unions and the right to dissolve them." Id.at 179.
115. Rosengarten v. Downes, 806 A.2d 1066, 1066 (Conn. 2002).
116. See Fred A. Bernstein, Same-Sex Union Hard to Dissolve: Vermont Offers Divorces, But
Only for Residents, S. FL. SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 14, 2003, availableat 2003 WL18838147.
117. The Vermont civil union statute expressly provides that parties to a civil union receive
spousal benefits such as rights of survivorship, waiver of will, and intestacy. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1204(e)(1) (2002). The plaintiff explained that he brought the dissolution action because .'I was
concerned for my heirs, for my three children.., and I want to get some kind of closure."' Cheryl
Wetzstein, Legal Problems Raised When Civil Unions Sour; Recognition Outside Vermont New
Battlegroundfor Gay Rights, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2002, at A04 (quoting Glen Rosengarten)
(ellipsis in original).
118. Notwithstanding the lack of jurisdiction over the dissolution proceeding in Connecticut, a
probate court in Connecticut or some other state where decedent's property is located will have to
consider whether or not to respect the rights of inheritance granted by the Vermont law. See infra
text accompanying notes 122-24.
119. See Patricia Wen, Reversal Sought on Gay Couple's Divorce: Texas Case Eyes Vermont
Civil Union, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 28, 2003, at B2.
120. In response to fears that individual states would authorize same-sex marriage and that
other states would be required to honor them, Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act
("DOMA"), Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). The first provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1738(c),
provides that
[n]o State ...shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial
proceeding of any other State ...respecting a relationship between persons of the same
sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State ...or a right or claim
arising from such relationship.
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is a usual basis for jurisdiction over divorce/dissolution actions, but a
state with such an act would be even more likely to follow the approach
21
of Rosengarten in finding that there is no relationship to dissolve.1
The second provision, I U.S.C. § 7, defines "marriage" and "spouse" in any congressional act,
federal statute, regulation, or ruling as "only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife" and "only ... a person of the opposite sex," respectively. For more on the
Defense of Marriage Act, see Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of
Marriage Act Is Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1997); Michael T. Morley et al.,
Developments in Law and Policy: Emerging Issues in Family Law, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 169,
188-98 (2003) (discussing various state models for avoiding recognition of same-sex unions); Mark
Strasser, Some Observations about DOMA, Marriages, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships,
30 CAP. U. L. REV. 363 (2002); Evan Wolfson & Michael F. Melcher, Constitutional and Legal
Defects in the "Defense of Marriage" Act, 16 QUtNNIPIAC L. REV. 221 (1996). Subsequently, the
majority of states enacted their own legislative versions, some of which are even more restrictive as
to the effect to be given to same-sex marriages. For example, the Nebraska DOMA provides that
"[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman shall be valid or recognized in Nebraska. The uniting
of two persons of the same sex in a civil union, domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex
relationship shall not be valid or recognized in Nebraska." NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29; see generally
Christopher Rizzo, Banning State Recognition of Same-sex Relationships: Constitutional
Implications of Nebraska's Initiative 416, 11 J.L. & POL'Y 1 (2002). Some states utilized legislation
to recast the conflict of laws rule and then define public policy. For example, the Idaho version of
DOMA provides generally that marriages are valid in Idaho if valid in the place of celebration
"unless they violate the public policy of this state. Marriages that violate the public policy of this
state include, but are not limited to, same-sex marriages." IDAHO CODE § 32-209 (Michie 2000).
The Georgia statute is perhaps the most explicit:
(a) It is declared to be the public policy of this state to recognize the union only of man
and woman. Marriages between persons of the same sex are prohibited in this state.
(b) No marriage between persons of the same sex shall be recognized as entitled to the
benefits of marriage. Any marriage entered into by persons of the same sex pursuant to a
marriage license issued by another state or foreign jurisdiction or otherwise shall be void
in this state. Any contractual rights granted by virtue of such license shall be
unenforceable in the courts of this state and the courts of this state shall have no
jurisdiction whatsoever under any circumstances to grant a divorce or separate
maintenance with respect to such marriage or otherwise to consider or rule on any of the
parties' respective rights arising as a result of or in connection with such marriage.
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (1996).
121. For example, two men who had entered into a civil union in Vermont sought to dissolve it
in their state of residence, Texas. The partners divided their assets by agreement, and the trial court
initially granted the dissolution. See Judge OKs Beaumont Gay Divorce, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 8,
2003 at 36. After the Texas Attorney General intervened, the trial judge agreed to rehear the matter.
Before he did, however, the plaintiff withdrew his petition for dissolution. See Judge Dismisses
Gay's Request for Divorce, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 2, 2003, available at 2003 WL 3248881. In
1997, the Texas legislature passed legislation, prohibiting a marriage license from being issued to
"persons of the same sex." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.001 (Vernon 1998 & Supp. 2003). Even so,
the threatened dissolution of a civil union in Texas served as the impetus of the passage of a DOMA
in Texas. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204 (Vernon Supp. 2003) (effective Sept. 1, 2003); Kelley
Shannon, Texas Law Bans Official Recognition of Same-Sex Unions Formed in Other States,
ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, May 28, 2003. The act, which took effect on September 1, 2003,
provides, in relevant part:
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Of course, courts may or may not recognize civil unions for
purposes other than dissolution. As Rosengarten itself indicates, the
effect to be given a civil union becomes important for inheritance,
wrongful death, pension rights, and other issues. In the absence of
private, municipal arrangements, or specific state legislation that may
grant a particular benefit, the right to benefits will turn on a state's
decision of whether or not to recognize the relationship. 22 In Langan v.
(a) In this section, "civil union" means any relationship status other than marriage that:
(1) is intended as an alternative to marriage or applies primarily to cohabitating
persons; and
(2) grants to the parties of the relationship legal protections, benefits, or
responsibilities granted to the spouses of a marriage.
(b) A marriage between persons of the same sex or a civil union is contrary to the public
policy of this state and is void in this state.
(c) The state or an agency or political subdivision of the state may not give effect to a:
(1) public act, record, or judicial proceeding that creates, recognizes, or validates a
marriage between persons of the same sex or a civil union in this state or in any
other jurisdiction; or
(2) right or claim to any legal protection, benefit, or responsibility asserted as a
result of a marriage between persons of the same sex or a civil union in this state or
in any other jurisdiction.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN., supra, § 6.204.
122. State and municipal regulations may take several forms, and many are not restricted to
same-sex couples. See generally, William C. Duncan, Domestic PartnershipLaws in the United
States: A Review and Critique, 2001 BYU L. REV. 961 (2001). For example, same-sex and
opposite-sex couples are eligible to register as domestic partners under New York City's
Administrative Code, provided, among other things, that "both persons are residents of the city of
New York or ... at least one partner is employed by the city of New York on the date of
registration." ADMIN. CODE § 3-241(l)(a)-(b) (2002); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-702(a)(l)-(3)
(2003) (allowing parties who are "at least 18 years old and competent to contract" and who are "the
sole domestic partner of the other" and "not married" to register as domestic partners). Such
regulations are not immune from challenge. See, e.g., Slattery v. City of New York, 266 A.D.2d 24,
24-26 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (upholding Domestic Partners Law against challenges that municipal
government "impermissibly legislate[d] in the area of marriage" and that it "transformed the
domestic partnership into a form of common law marriage"). In addition to the civil union and
reciprocal beneficiaries statute enacted in Vermont, other states have sought to provide protections
to couples, who cannot or choose not to marry. California merged the concepts of a domestic
partnership registry with a reciprocal beneficiaries law designed primarily for health benefits and
medical decision-making into one statute:
(a) Domestic partners are two adults who have chosen to share one another's lives in an
intimate and committed relationship of mutual caring.
(b) A domestic partnership shall be established in California when all of the following
requirements are met:
(1) Both persons have a common residence.
(2) Both persons agree to be jointly responsible for each other's basic living
expenses incurred during the domestic partnership.
(3) Neither person is married or a member of another domestic partnership.
(4) The two persons are not related by blood in a way that would prevent them
from being married to each other in this state.
(5) Both persons are at least 18 years of age.
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St. Vincent's Hospital of New York, 123 a New York trial court found "that
New York's public policy does not preclude recognition of a same-sex
union entered into in a sister state" and held a same-sex partner pursuant
to a Vermont civil union to have the same rights as a spouse under the
New York wrongful death statute.124 The New York decision is not
unlike a much earlier New York Court of Appeals decision, In re May's
Estate,125 which used a choice of law analysis and applied the law of the
(6) Either of the following:
(A) Both persons are members of the same sex.
(B) One or both of the persons meet the eligibility criteria under Title II of the
Social Security Act as defined in 42 U.S.C. Section 402(a) for old-age
insurance benefits or Title XVI of the Social Security Act as defined in 42
U.S.C. Section 1381 for aged individuals. Notwithstanding any other
provision of this section, persons of opposite sexes may not constitute a
domestic partnership unless one or both of the persons are over the age of 62.
(7) Both persons are capable of consenting to the domestic partnership.
(8) Neither person has previously filed a Declaration of Domestic Partnership with
the Secretary of State pursuant to this division that has not been terminated under
Section 299.
(9) Both file a Declaration of Domestic Partnership with the Secretary of State
pursuant to this division.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(a)-(b) (West 2003). When then Governor Gray Davis signed amendments to
the above into law, he clarified that "[i]n California, a legal marriage is between a man and a
woman." Press Release, Office of the Governor of the State of California, Governor's Signing
Message Regarding 2001 Stat. 893; see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (West 2003) (providing that
"[m]arriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract between a man and a woman").
Effective January 1, 2005, the California law will be amended, and "[r]egistered domestic partners
shall have the same rights, protections, and benefits, and shall be subject to the same
responsibilities, obligations, and duties under law, whether they derive from statutes, administrative
regulations, court rules, government policies, common law, or any other provisions or sources of
law, as are granted to and imposed upon spouses." See The California Domestic Partner Rights and
Responsibilities Act of 2003, § 4, 2003 Cal. Legis. Serv. 421 (West).
123. 765 N.Y.S.2d 411 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.2003).
124. Id. at 416, 422. In Langan, the existence of "a state sanctioned union equivalent to
marriage" between the plaintiff and the decedent allowed the court to distinguish Raum v.
Restaurant Associates, Inc., 252 A.D.2d 369, 370 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding "that the
wrongful-death statute, which ... does not give individuals not married to the decedent ... a right
to bring a wrongful-death action, operates without regard to sexual orientation, in that unmarried
couples living together, whether heterosexual or homosexual, similarly lack the right to bring a
wrongful-death action") and In re Cooper, 187 A.D.2d 128, 134-35 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (holding
that same-sex partner was not "surviving spouse" for purposes of asserting elective share against
decedent's will). Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 413-14. In this regard, it is significant to note that New
York has not enacted a state version of DOMA. See id. at 415. At the time of writing, an appeal by
St. Vincent's Hospital in Langan was pending. See Leigh Jones, Beyond Borders, N.Y.L.J., Nov.
25, 2003.
125. 114 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1953). Indeed the court in Langan cites May's Estate, among other
decisions, in support of the proposition that "if plaintiff has a validly contracted marriage in the
[s]tate of Vermont, and if the Vermont civil union does not offend public policy as would an
incestuous or polygamous union, it will be recognized in the [s]tate of New York for purposes of the
wrongful death statute." Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
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place of celebration to uphold a husband's right to administer the estate
of his wife. The thirty-five year marriage between the uncle and his
niece in May's Estate was valid under the law of Rhode Island, where
the marriage was celebrated, but invalid under New York law, where the
parties were domiciled from the time of the marriage. 126 Although it may
be tempting to view cases like May's Estate as enshrining the place of
celebration rule with respect to the validity of a marriage (or same-sex
union), the conflict of laws issues are considerably more complex. 127 In
many of the cases that apply the place of celebration rule, the issues at
stake do not implicate strong state interests. 128 In other cases such as
May's Estate, where more important regulatory interests are apparent,
courts have been willing to adopt a place of celebration rule to uphold
the relationship with respect to an incident of the marriage because
invalidating the relationship at that particular point in time has little
relationship to the real concerns behind the other state's invalidity rule.
Other courts have found that denying a benefit--even at a later point in
time-is a particularly effective way of enforcing its marriage regulatory
policy. 129 In particular, states with their own "defense of marriage" acts

are unlikely to recognize civil unions for any purpose, particularly when
126.
127.

See In re May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d at 5-7,
Even the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws provided that "[a] marriage which is

against the law of the state of domicile of either party," even if valid where celebrated, would be
invalid everywhere when the issue of validity involved polygamy, incest, or similarly "void"
marriages. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 132 (1934). The Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws was even more explicit in stating that "[a] marriage which satisfies the
requirements of the state where the marriage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid

unless it violates the strong public policy of another state which had the most significant
relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971). For a more extensive discussion of these issues, see Brian
H. Bix, Choice of Law and Marriage: A Proposal, 36 FAM. L.Q. 255, 256-62 (2002); Andrew
Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage,Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 TEX. L. REv. 921, 962-88
(1998); Silberman, supra note 72, at 196-99. New York City adopted a middle ground by extending "all

the rights and benefits available to domestic partners registered pursuant to [the Administrative
Code]" to "[m]embers of a marriage that is not recognized by the state of New York, a domestic
partnership, or a civil union, lawfully entered into in another jurisdiction" unless such a marriage
violates the proscriptions of the New York Domestic Relations Law section 5 (incestuous
marriages) or section 6 (bigamous marriages). ADMIN. CODE § 3-245 (1998). This approach is
similar to that taken by the German Lebenspartnerschafisgesetz.See supra text accompanying notes
98-100, 105.

128. Many of the issues involved matters of formalities such as licensing requirements; even
more substantial restrictions involved age requirements where the differences in state regulation
were relatively minor. See Silberman, supranote 72, at 196-97.
129. See, e.g., Catalano v. Catalano, 170 A.2d 726, 727, 728-29 (Conn. 1961) (holding that

plaintiff could not qualify for a "widow's allowance" as surviving spouse to decedent, her uncle, as
"[tihe marriage of the plaintiff and Fred Catalano, though valid in Italy under its laws, was not valid
in Connecticut because it contravened the public policy of this state").
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their own residents or domiciliaries have left the state to contract a civil
30
union.
Residency or domicile requirements for civil unions could
ultimately have advantages for same-sex couples. Those same-sex
couples, who are resident in Vermont at the time of their civil union,
have the strongest claim for recognition of their relationship. The
interest of Vermont in protecting and upholding the relationship of its
residents is entitled to great weight even should the couple move at a
later point in time. As we have suggested elsewhere, as a normative
matter, the law of the parties' residence/domicile at the time of marriage
is the appropriate reference for the determination of the validity of the
particular relationship.'13' Of course, states with "defense of marriage"
acts may nonetheless deny recognition even to those (true Vermont)
couples who later move to their state, but their claim for doing so is
substantially weakened.
C.

The Recent Decision in Canadaand its Aftermath

A recent decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Canada,
Halpern v. Toronto, 32 has attracted enormous attention by extending full
marriage rights to same-sex couples. 133 Several same-sex couples sought
130. In Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002), for example, the Georgia Court of
Appeals held a mother violated her custodial agreement with her ex-husband by living with an
unrelated adult even though she was living with her partner with whom she had concluded a civil
union in Vermont. See id. at 48-49. In so doing, the court first found that a civil union was not a
marriage and that therefore the mother violated the visitation order, which provided that visitation
would not take place "'during any time where such party cohabits with or has overnight stays with
any adult to which such party is not legally married or to whom party is not related within the
second degree."' Id. at 48. Second, the court held that "even if Vermont had purported to legalize
same-sex marriages, such would not be recognized in Georgia, the place where the consent decree
was ordered and agreed to by both parties (both of whom are Georgia residents), and more
importantly the place where the present action is brought." Id. at 49 (quoting Georgia's DOMA,
supra note 120). The Supreme Court of Georgia denied the mother's petition for certiorari. 2002
LEXIS 626 (Ga. 2002).
131. See Silberman, supra note 72, at 203-04.
132. [2003] 65 O.R.3d 161.
133. Some have suggested that the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v.
Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003), in which the Court overturned Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986), and held that a Texas statute criminalizing sodomy between two members of the same-sex
violated the Fourteenth Amendment, see Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484, signals a possible move in
the same direction in the United States. See generally Sarah Kershaw, Adversaries on Gay Rights
Vow State-By-State Fight, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2003, § 1, at 8; Dean E. Murphy, Gays Celebrate,
and Plan Campaignfor Broader Rights, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2003, at A20; Sheryl Gay Stolberg,
Democratic Candidates Split on Issue of Gay Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2003, at A14.
Although Justice Scalia, writing the dissent in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas
joined, bemoaned that the majority's holding paves the way for the recognition of same-sex
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marriage licenses in Toronto, and the Clerk of the City of Toronto and
the couples turned to the courts for direction as to whether or not the
licenses could be granted. Relying on section 15(1) of Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, which provides that "[e]very individual is equal
before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and
equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular,
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour,
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability," the Court of Appeal
found the common law definition of marriage as between one man and
one woman violated the couples' equality rights. 134 The Ontario court
corrected this "inconsistency" in the treatment of same-sex and oppositesex couples by "declar[ing] invalid the existing definition of marriage to
marriages, 123 S. Ct. at 2497-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting), the opinion is much more limited. It
decriminalizes certain intimate conduct between consenting adults but does not put the state's
imprimatur behind those relationships. Id. at 2484. As Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority
noted, "[the present case] does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to
any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. The case does involve two adults who, with
full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual
lifestyle." Id. The decision may in fact provoke action to entrench the traditional definition of
marriage. Prior to the Court's ruling, a bill was introduced to amend the United States Constitution
to state that "[m]arriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman."
H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003); see also Congressman Fights Against Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES, July 2, 2003; FristOpposes Gay Marriage,N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2003, at B8 (noting Senate
Majority Leader's support for constitutional amendment). Initially, President Bush questioned
whether such an amendment was necessary in light of the Supreme Court's ruling, and the proposal
is currently under consideration before the House of Representatives Judiciary Subcommittee on the
Constitution. See Associated Press, Bush: Gay Marriage Ban May Be Too Soon, available at
http://www.belleville.com/mld/belleville/6222431.htm, July 3, 2003; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, White
House Avoids Stand on Gay Marriage Measure, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2003, at A22. President Bush
subsequently declared, "I believe marriage is between a man and a woman, and I believe we ought
to codify that one way or the other, and we have lawyers looking at the best way to do that." David
Stout, Bush Looking for Means to Prevent Gay Marriage in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2003; see
also Elizabeth Bumiller, MarriageAmendment Backed by Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2003 ("Mr.
Bush has also said that he believes the issue of gay marriage is a state question, rather than a federal
one ... 'except and unless judicial rulings undermine the sanctity of marriage; in which case we
may need a constitutional amendment."'); Robert Pear & David D. Kirkpatrick, Bush Plans $1.5
Billion Drive for Promotion of Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2004 (describing Bush
Administration proposal to promote marriage through "advertising campaigns to publicize the value
of marriage, instruction in marriage skills and mentoring programs that use married couples as role
models"). It is unclear what relationship such "measures" would have with DOMA, discussed supra
at note 120. See Stout, supra. After the rulings by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and
the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples in San Francisco, discussed infra at note 154,
President Bush announced his support for a constitutional amendment, stating that "[tihe
amendment should fully protect marriage, while leaving the state legislatures free to make their own
choices in defining legal arrangements other than marriage." President Bush "sRemarks on SameSex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2004; see also David Stout, Congress Is Urged To Begin
Process To Amend Constitution,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2004.
134. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d l61, 9n.1,
59, 144.
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the extent that it refers to 'one man and one woman', [sic] and ...
reformulat[ing] the definition of marriage as 'the
voluntary union for life
' 35
of two persons to the exclusion of all others. "" 1

The Ontario decision followed the enactment in other Canadian
provinces of legislation based on earlier less sweeping rulings,' 36 and the
stage has been set for further legislative action in Canada on a national
level. 137 Although such legislation seems likely to pass, the ultimate
denouement in Canada may be more difficult to predict. 138 A decision of

135. Id.
148; see also Colin Nickerson, Ontario Court OK's Same-Sex Marriage, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 11, 2003, at Al.
136. In response to the Supreme Court of Quebec's decision in Hendricks v. Qufbec, [2002]
R.J.Q. 2506, Quebec created civil unions "for couples of the opposite or the same sex who wish to
make a public commitment to live together as a couple and to uphold the rights and obligations
stemming from such status." An Act Instituting Civil Unions and Establishing New Rules of
Filiation, Explanatory Notes, 2002 S.Q. c. 6 (2002), available at http://www.publicationsduquebec.
gouv.qc.ca/home.php. Attorney General Paul Begin of Qudbec described the civil unions as "'just
like marriage for heterosexuals."' Quebec Plans to Legalize Same-Sex Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27,
2002, at A2. Nova Scotia established registered domestic partnerships for both same-sex and
opposite-sex couples, granting those who register "entitlements such as spousal support, protection
under the Matrimonial Property Act and the right to see their partners' medical records and make
medical decisions in an emergency." Alison Auld, First in Canada to Legally Register Same-Sex
Relationship. Nova Scotia Couple Makes History, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, June 5, 2001, at BI,
availableat 2001 WL 21095169. Following Halpern, the British Columbia Court of Appeal found
the common law bar to same-sex marriage violated the Canadian Charter and amended the common
law definition of marriage to be "the lawful union of two persons to the exclusion of all others," but
suspended the relief until July 12, 2004 "to give the federal and provincial governments time to
review and revise legislation to bring it into accord with this decision." EGALE Canada Inc. v.
Canada, [2003] 13 B.C.L.R.4th 1,
158-59, 161; see also Colin Nickerson, British Columbia
Approves Gay, Lesbian Marriages,BOSTON GLOBE, July 9, 2003, at A6, available at 2003 WL
3407234.
137. Notably, Justice Minister Martin Cauchon did not seek an immediate stay of the ruling.
See Jeffrey Hodgson & Randall Palmer, Toronto Issues Gay Marriage Licenses After Ruling,
REUTERS, June 10, 2003. After the Ontario Court's ruling and the decision not to appeal, then Prime
Minister Jean Chr6tien announced that his government would propose federal legislation to expand
the definition of marriage to include same-sex couples. See Clifford Krauss, Canadian Leaders
Agree to Propose Gay MarriageLaw, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2003, at A l; Colin Nickerson, Canada
to Draft a Law Recognizing Gay Marriages,BOSTON GLOBE, June 18, 2003, at Al, available at
2003 WL 3402419. In an effort to insulate the new legislation from potential challenges by more
conservative provinces, then Prime Minister Chrdtien stated that he would give the proposed bill to
the Canadian Supreme Court first for a constitutionality review and then submit it to Parliament for
a vote. See Social Policy in Canada:Judges Come Outfor Gays, ECONOMIST, June 21, 2003, at 32.
138. Support for same-sex marriage is far from universal in Canada. Mr. Chrdtien's successor,
Prime Minister Paul Martin, stated that he supported "eliminating any form of discrimination
against gays," Associated Press, Canada Gets a New Prime Minister, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2003,
but also that "he would ask the Supreme Court for its opinion on whether granting gay and lesbian
couples civil union rights rather than full marriage rights would be constitutional." Clifford Krauss,
New Prime Minister Is Steering Canada Cautiously to the Right, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2003, at A9.
Prime Minister Martin has since asked the Supreme Court whether the definition of marriage as
between a man and a woman violates the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, citing divided
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similar magnitude was rendered by the Hawaiian Supreme Court in
Baehr v. Lewin139 in 1993, but a later amendment to the Hawaiian

public opinion. The Supreme Court had scheduled a hearing for April 16, 2004 on the issue of
same-sex marriage, but the hearing will likely be postponed. See Canada's Debate on Gay
Marriage Could be Delayed, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 29, 2004, available at 2004 WL
67485180; see also Howard Williams, Canadian Government Increases Hints of May Election,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 5, 2004, available at 2004 WL 68826803 (stating that "[tihe federal
government promised to introduce nationwide legislation after the Supreme Court answers
questions on the constitutionality of same-sex marriages"). At least one legislator from Alberta has
threatened to challenge the new legislation, see Krauss, Canadian Leaders, supra, and members of
Chr~tien's own party have expressed concern that such legislation could cost the party seats in
coming elections. See Canada Vows to Push Ahead with Gay Marriage Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21,
2003. One member of Parliament was severely beaten by a constituent for his support of same-sex
marriage. See Monday's Canada Briefs: New Brunswick MP Andy Scott Says Beating Hasn't
Weakened His Political Resolve, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2003. Representatives of the Catholic Church
have also spoken out against the planned legislation. See Tuesday's Canada Brief: PM Ignores
Threats of Damnation Regarding Gay Marriage Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2003; Clifford Krauss,
Canada's Push to Legalize Gay Marriage Draws Bishops' Ire, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2003.
Commentators have attributed the provincial and federal governments' seeming lack of opposition
to the perception that the general public supports gay marriage. See Toronto Issues Gay Marriage
Licenses, supra (quoting Deputy Prime Minister John Manley as saying, "'I think it's time for us to
recognize that same-sex marriages are part of our societal norm'); Clifford Krauss, News Analysis:
Canada's Gay Marriage Plan, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2003 (discussing opinion poll "results that
show a majority of Canadians support expanding marriage to gay couples"). Interestingly, a Gallup
opinion poll conducted in May 2003 revealed that sixty percent of the American public believes that
intimate relations between consenting same-sex adults should be legal, eighty-eight percent believe
gays and lesbians should not be discriminated against by employers, and fifty percent believe samesex couples should be able to marry and to adopt. See Gay Kiss: Business as Usual, N.Y. TIMES,
June 22, 2003; see also Robin Toner, Opposition to Gay Marriage Is Declining, Study Finds, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 2003. But see Susan Page, Poll Shows Backlash on Gay Issues, USA TODAY, July
28, 2003 (reporting July 2003 USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll where forty-six percent felt same-sex
relations between consenting adults should not be legal and fifty-seven percent opposed civil unions
for same-sex couples); Katharine Q. Seelye & Janet Elder, Strong Support Is Foundfor Ban on Gay
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003 (reporting December 2003 New York Times/CBS News poll
where, of fifty-three percent who said marriage was religious matter, seventy-one percent opposed
gay marriage and of thirty-three percent who said marriage was legal matter, fifty-five percent
supported gay marriage).
139. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (finding that, under Hawaii Constitution, strict scrutiny applied
to sex-based classification of state marriage statute), reh "ggranted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw.
1993), appeal after remand, Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996), remanded to Baehr v.
Miike, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996), aff'd, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997). A same-sex
couple brought a similar case under the Alaska Constitution, challenging the constitutionality of the
state's refusal to grant them a marriage license and the constitutionality of the Alaska statute
providing that "[a] same-sex relationship may not be recognized by the state as being entitled to the
benefits of marriage" under both the state and federal constitutions. Brause v. State, 21 P.3d 357,
358 (Alaska 2001) (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013(b) (Michie 2002). During the pendency of
the litigation, the first two claims were mooted by an amendment to the Alaska Constitution,
providing that "[tlo be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may exist only between one man
and one woman." ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25. The Alaskan Supreme Court dismissed the third
claim on the ground that it was not ripe for review after finding the plaintiffs failed to "assert[] that
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Constitution reserved the legislature's power to limit marriage to couples
of the opposite sex, 140 which was restated as a legislative finding "that
the people of Hawaii choose to preserve the tradition of marriage as a
unique social institution based upon the committed union of one man
and one woman." 141 As part of the legislative compromise, Hawaii also
adopted a reciprocal beneficiaries statute, which extended certain
benefits, such as the right to designate a beneficiary for inheritance,
medical insurance, or hospital visits, to people who are ineligible to
142
marry.
Similar challenges to state marriage license requirements were
recently decided in Massachusetts, Arizona, and New Jersey. In
Goodridge v. Department of Health, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts applied a rational basis test to the state's refusal to issue
marriage licenses to same-sex couples and found that "[1]imiting the
protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage to opposite-sex
couples violated the basic premises of individual liberty and equality
under the law protected by the Massachusetts Constitution."' 43 The court
cited the remedy in Halpern with approval, but restricted itself to the
relief requested by plaintiffs-a declaration "that barring an individual
from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely
because that person would marry a person of the same sex violates the
Massachusetts Constitution."'144 The court remanded the matter for entry
of judgment consistent with its opinion, but stayed the entry of that
judgment for six months "to permit the Legislature to take such action as
it may deem appropriate in light of this opinion."'' 45 To clarify the
court's decision, the Massachusetts Senate asked the court if a proposed
bill creating civil unions for same-sex couples satisfied its mandate. In
response, the court reiterated its holding in Goodridge "that group
classifications based on unsupportable distinctions, such as that
embodied in the proposed [civil union] bill, are invalid under the
Massachusetts Constitution."'' 46 Finding the proposed civil union bill

they have been or in their current circumstances that they will be denied rights that are available to
married partners." Brause, 21 P.3d at 360.
140. See HAW. CONST. art, 1, § 23.
141. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-2 (Supp. 2001).
142. See id. §§ 572C-1 to -7 (Supp. 2001); see also Mark Strasser, Baehr Mysteries,
Retroactivity, and the Concept ofLaw, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 161, 176 n.74 (2000).
143. 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003).
144. Id. at 969.
145. Id. at 969-70.
146. Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 569. The decision was again a 4-3
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unconstitutional, the court held that Goodridge served not only to extend
the rights, protections, and benefits of marriage to same-sex couples, but
also to eliminate the second-class
status created by denying same-sex
147
couples access to civil marriage.
The Massachusetts decisions may have a more limited impact
nationwide. First, recognition remains a central problem. As the court
itself admonished in Goodridge, "[w]e would not presume to dictate
how another state should respond to [our] decision."' 148 In its response to
the senate's query, the court stressed that its decision was based on "the
strong protection of individual rights guaranteed by the Massachusetts
Constitution" even though "those rights may not be acknowledged
elsewhere."' 149 The court reiterated that "We do not resolve, nor would
we attempt to, the consequences of our holding in other jurisdictions.' 5 °
Second, as discussed supra, were same-sex marriage legalized in
Massachusetts, the statutes governing the issuance of marriage licenses
would preclude couples, who could not marry in their home
jurisdictions, from marrying in Massachusetts. 151 Of course, nothing
would prevent Massachusetts residents, who marry in Massachusetts,
from moving to another state and seeking to have their marital status
recognized there. Finally, the Massachusetts legislators convened a
constitutional convention to consider several alternate amendments to
the Massachusetts Constitution, which would define marriage as
between one man and one woman. Although the convention was
adjourned for one month without a vote on the amendments, the issue
remains very much alive. 152 Due to the requirement of a second vote
before the legislature and a public referendum, the earliest any
constitutional amendment could take effect is November 2006.' This
raises the question of what will happen to couples who marry after the
court's deadline of May 17, 2003, but before the Massachusetts
Constitution is amended. One proposed solution would be to downgrade
147. Id. at 569-71.
148. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 967.
149. Opinions, 2004 WL 202184 at 571.
150.

Id.

151. See text accompanying notes 75-76; see also Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 972 n.4 (Greaney,
J., concurring) (noting that Massachusetts law would preclude the use of legalization of same-sex
marriage in Massachusetts "as a tool to obtain recognition of a marriage in [another] State that is
otherwise unlawful.") (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, §§ 11, 12, 13 (1998)).
152. See Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Lawmakers, after Heated Debate, Put Off Vote on Gay
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004; see also Associated Press, Mass. Governor Mum in Gay
MarriageDebate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2004; Pam Belluck, How Massachusetts Left Gay Marriage
at the Altar, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2004.

153.

See MASS. CONST. art. 48(IV).
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those same-sex marriages to civil unions after an amendment takes
effect. 154
In Arizona, an intermediate appellate court applied a similar
analysis pursuant to the Arizona and federal constitutions but came to a
different result in Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. County of
Maricopa.155 Finding no fundamental right to marry a same-sex partner
sounding in the due process clauses of the Arizona and federal
constitutions or in the privacy provisions of the Arizona Constitution,
the court applied a rational basis test and found "that the State has a
legitimate interest in encouraging procreation and child-rearing within
the marital relationship, and that limiting marriage to opposite-sex
couples is rationally related to that interest."' 56 A New Jersey trial court
reached a similar conclusion in Lewis v. Harrisafter rejecting claims of
a fundamental right to marry a same-sex partner and privacy under the
New Jersey and federal constitutions. 157 The court found that the state
had "articulated more than adequate reasons to support the public need
for such restriction [on marriage]" in that the state "has an interest in
fostering and facilitating the traditional notions of family" and being in

154. See Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Weighs a Deal on Marriages Between Gays, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. I1,2004. Same-sex couples who marry in San Francisco may face a similar problem.
In a unilateral act, the mayor of San Francisco decreed that the city, which is also its own county,
would issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples. At the time of writing, over 3,400 same-sex
couples had wed in San Francisco since the first ceremony was performed on February 12, 2004.
Although neither the trial court nor the California Supreme Court granted requests for preliminary
injunctions, challenges to the mayor's power to issue such a decree remain pending. See Associated
Press, Calif Court Won't Stop Gay Marriages,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2004; Dean E. Murphy &
Carolyn Marshall, Gay Weddings Continue in San Franciscoas Lawyers Argue, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
18, 2004; Carolyn Marshall, More Than 50 Gay Couples Are Married in San Francisco, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004. A mini-DOMA is in effect in California, see supra note 120, and the
marriages would not appear to be valid even in California until that law is successfully challenged.
The mayor of New Paltz, New York had married over twenty-four same-sex couples at the time of
writing despite the town clerk's refusal to grant the marriage licenses. See Marc Santora & Thomas
Crampton, Gay MarriageDebate Shifts to Small New York Township, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004.
Although New York has not enacted a mini-DOMA, it is questionable whether these marriages will
be recognized even within the township of New Paltz. As the Attorney General of New York noted,
"[tihe validity of the marriages and the legality of the mayor's action will be determined in due
course in the courts." Associated Press, More Gay Couples to Marry in N.Y, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,
2004.
155. 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. A.D. 2003).
156. Id. at 460-61, 463-64. The court also rejected the petitioners' equal protection argument
based on a rational relationship analysis. See id. at 465. At the time of writing, petitioners were
seeking review of the decision before the Arizona Supreme Court. See Judy Nichols, Same-Sex
MarriageAdvances; Mass. Ruling May Aid Ariz. Couple's Appeal, ARIZ.REPUBLIC, Nov. 19, 2003,
Al.
157. No. MER-L-15-03 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 5, 2003) 1, 68-69, available at
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/feinberg/feinberg.pdf.
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harmony with other states. 158 Citing the "magnitude" of the social
change sought, the court concluded by commending the state legislature
"to carefully examine and consider the expanded rights afforded to
same-sex couples in other jurisdictions" as the "appropriate
avenue for a
1' 59
Legislature."
the
is
marriage
of
meaning
the
change in
In the wake of that decision, New Jersey enacted the Domestic
Partnership Act, 160 which "creates a mechanism, through the
establishment of domestic partnerships, for New Jersey to recognize and
support the many adult individuals in this State who share an important
16
personal, emotional and committed relationship with another adult.", '
Pursuant to the Act, both same-sex partners and opposite-sex couples
aged sixty-two years or more may join in a registered partnership.162 The
inclusion of the older, opposite-sex couples reflects the state's primary
purpose in enacting the legislation-the recognition of "familial
relationships, which ... assist the State by their establishment of a

private network of support for the financial, physical and emotional
health of their participants.' 63 Indeed, to be eligible to join in a domestic
partnership, the potential partners must show some indicia of being
jointly responsible for each other's common welfare through joint
ownership and "agree to be jointly responsible for each other's basic
living expenses during the domestic partnership."' 164 The Act is less like
a civil union and more like a reciprocal beneficiaries law in that it
extends only limited rights to partners, including pension and other taxrelated benefits, medical decision-making rights, and the extension of
statutory protections against discrimination. 65 Significantly, eligibility
to enter into such a domestic partnership is restricted to partners who
have a common residence in New Jersey or who have a common
residence elsewhere and one partner is a member of a state-sponsored
retirement plan. 66 The Act also provides that a "domestic partnership,
civil union or reciprocal beneficiary relationship entered into outside of
this State, which is valid under the laws of the jurisdiction under which

158. Id.at 58.
159. Id. at 69.
160.

Domestic

Partnership

Act,

Pub.

L.

2003,

ch.

246

(2004),

available

at

http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2002/Bills/PL03/246_.PDF.
161.

Legislative Statement to Assembly Bill, No. 3743

(Dec.

11, 2003), available at

http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bills/BiliView.asp.
162. See Domestic Partnership Act § 4(b).
163. Id. § 2(b).
164. Id. § 4(b)(l), (2), Sec. 3.
165. See id. § 2(c), (d), (e).
166. See id. § 3.
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the partnership was created, shall be valid in this State."'' 67 It will be
interesting to see what effect this statutory policy has for recognition of
same-sex marriages in New Jersey. On the one hand, the Act makes no
mention of same-sex marriage; on the other, New Jersey has not enacted
a defense of marriage statute.168
Under the Ontario ruling, same-sex couples can and have already
married. 169 Indeed several same-sex couples in the United States have
secured marriage licenses in Toronto, Ottawa, and Windsor, taking
advantage of the absence of a residency requirement. 170 But as noted
above, couples from the United States who try to take advantage of the
liberalized Canadian regimes for celebration of a marriage may gain
very little upon return to the United States. States in the United Stateswith or without "defense of marriage" acts-may decide not to give
effect to the panoply of rights that come with marriage, though some
courts may choose to recognize the marriage and its effects. 17 1 As the
Canadian Parliament contemplates enacting federal marriage or civil
union legislation in the aftermath of this decision, the central question is
to whom such legislation should apply. The use of residency
requirements (as in the Netherlands) or prohibitions against same-sex
marriages or civil unions if prohibited by the state of a party's
nationality or residence (as in Belgium or in Massachusetts) are possible
167. See id. §6(c).
168. Although New Jersey Governor James McGreevey signed the Domestic Partnership Act
into law and characterized the legislation as "a matter of fundamental decency," he has also stated
that "he would not support legislation that would amend the state's marriage laws to include samesex partners." Associated Press, N.J. OKs Benefits for Same-Sex Partners,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,
2004.
169. See Hodgson, supra note 137 (discussing immediate effect of Ontario court's ruling). In
recognition of Gay Pride Week, the Toronto clerk's office remained open over the weekend to
accommodate those seeking licenses. See Toronto Dash to Gay Unions, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003,
at A6.
170. See Clifford Krauss, A Few Gay Americans Tie the Knot in Canada,N.Y. TIMES, June 28,
2003, at A2; Sarah Robertson, Journeys: Mining the Gold in Gay Nuptials, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19,

2003 ("The number of couples from the United States who have gone to Canada to get married is
still relatively small-356 in Toronto (through December 16) and 729 in British Columbia (through

the end of November), according to government records."). The number of non-Canadians marrying
in Toronto is significant, however. See Steve Fairbaim, Seven American Same-Sex Couples
Exchange Wedding Vows in Toronto, CANADIAN PRESS, Feb. 14, 2004, available at 2004 WL
69754222 (reporting that 14,700 gays and lesbians married in Toronto from July 2003 through

year's end, of whom 6,800 were non-Canadians).
171.

See Christopher Marquis, U.S. Gays Who Marry in Canada Face Hurdles, N.Y. TIMES,

June 19, 2003, at A8 (noting that "Canadian-wed [same-sex] couples can expect a mixed reception
in the United States, with some businesses and localities recognizing their union, and federal offices
and a majority of the states rejecting it"); Debra Rosenberg, Breaking Up Is Hard To Do,
NEWSWEEK, July 7, 2003, at 44 (discussing residency requirements for divorce and dissolution of

civil unions in Canada and Vermont).
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models. Either would enable Canada to incorporate the values and social
norms that Canada holds for its own community without interfering with
the interests of other communities. At the same time, should Canadian
couples relocate at some point in the future, giving effect to the rights
and obligations that flow from relationships that were established and
endured in Canada would reflect a similar regard for the social norms of
the most relevant community.
III.

CONCLUSION

Marital and family issues reflect important values and social norms
in particular communities. Rules of private international law go a long
way in respecting the competing norms that are vying in a complex
global society.
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